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Abstract
The Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) at Newark AFB was
privatized-in-place as a result of the 1993 BRAC process. This was a first of a kind for
the DoD repair depot system. The justification was too much excess depot capacity and
by closing Newark the Air Force would rid itself of this excess capacity and obtain
savings by privatizing the repair workload.
This thesis concentrates on whether excess capacity at AGMC was as large as it
was identified and if cost saving had materialized at the depot since the privatization. To
determine how well the depot repairs were accomplished, performance metrics were
examined before and after the privatization occurred. With the trend of privatization in
the DoD depot system, many depot policy changes have occurred since the AGMC
privatization.
This research suggests the justification presented for closing Newark and
privatizing AGMC was not accurate, the costs to operate the privatized depot is has cost
the taxpayers $70 million more then if the depot would have remained organic, and how
recent legislative changes are leading to a preference for private industry to perform all
depot level maintence.

via

THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE AEROSPACE GUIDANCE AND
METROLOGY CENTER AT NEWARK AIR FORCE BASE

I. Introduction
General Issue
On 12 March 1993, the Secretary of Defense submitted a recommendation that
Newark Air Force Base (AFB) be for slated for closure under provisions of the 1993
Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC). On 2 July 1993, the President
approved the recommendation, which initiated the closing of Newark AFB and the
privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC).
The Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center, at the time, was the smallest of
the Air Force's depot maintenance facilities. The Secretary of Defense justified the
closure to support the significant reduction in force structure. The reduction in force and
infrastructure had resulted in a culmination of excess depot maintenance capacity of 8.7
million Direct Product Actual Hours (DPAH) in 1993, or about 30 percent excess
capacity (Fisher, 1996:20). The closure of Newark AFB was expected to reduce the Air
Force 8.7 million hours of excess depot capacity by 1.7 million DPAH. Additionally, this
was consistent with Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance to reduce excess
capacity, economize depot management, and increase competition and privatization
(Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1993:81).

The exact language written in the final BRAC recommendation stunned the local
communities of Newark and Heath. The BRAC recommendation included the closure of
Newark AFB along with the AGMC workload to be moved to other depot maintenance
facilities to include the private sector. There was no reference in the recommendation to
possibly privatize in place the AGMC workload. The community response to this
decision was immense to which they argued the maintenance facilities at Newark AFB
were one-of-a-kind and could not be reproduced at any other location. Ironically, studies
conducted by the Air Force in 1990 and 1991 for a previous round of base closures
identified numerous difficulties that kept Newark AFB from being recommended for
closure in 1991 (Fisher, 1996:14). At stake for the local communities were the jobs of
1,679 employees and a $200 million economic impact.
To compound the situation, unclear guidance from several governmental offices
added turmoil to the closure decision. The Secretary of Defense recommendation
specifically included privatization in place. The Acting Secretary of the Air Force
outlined four possible scenarios for privatizing the work at Newark: sale of the facilities
to a contractor; transfer the property to the state of Ohio with provisions that the facility
be used for Air Force work; conversion of the facility to a government-owned contractoroperated (GOCO) facility; and transfer property and workload to an employee buyout
group (Fisher, 1996:20-25). In the end, the BRAC recommendation did not include
wording for privatization in place.
However, the day after President Clinton approved the BRAC recommendations,
he announced a Five-Point Plan, a federal initiative to help communities recover from
base closures. This plan eventually became the Base Closure Communities Assistant Act

commonly referred to as the Pryor Amendment. This legislation established a new
property transfer mechanism that would enable the local community to aggressively
pursue privatization in place (Fisher, 1996:152).
Headquarters United States Air Force later issued Program Action Directive 9401, which provided guidance for base closures. This directive stated that, "the objective
of the workload transfer plan would be to maximize privatization in place at Newark
(Fisher, 1996:55)."
The responsibility to close Newark and to seek out the merits of a privatization in
place plan was placed upon Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) WrightPatterson AFB, Ohio. To evaluate the feasibility of privatization in place, the Workload
Transition Program Office (WTPO) assumed the responsibility developing an acquisition
strategy, creating a request for proposal, and managing the source selection (Fisher,
1996:60). After an extremely complicated and labor intensive analysis of proposals
submitted for the privatization, it was determined that the privatization proposals were
satisfactory to meet cost concerns. On 15 December 1994 AFMC announced that it had
awarded contracts to Rockwell OEM consortium (Boeing later acquired Rockwell) and
Wyle Laboratories for the Newark depot workloads (Fisher, 1996:116). This decision
sealed the fate of where the depot workload would be located and the future of the
employees of the AGMC.
However, there remained much skepticism on whether the cost figures for
privatization were accurate and if privatization would actually cost taxpayers more than if
Newark AFB continued to operate as a government facility. On 1 October 1996 Boeing

and Wyle Laboratories officially took over the depot operations from the Air Force which
had operated the complex since 1952.

Statement of Problem
On 1 October 1996 Boeing North America and Wyle Laboratories took control
of the former Newark AFB Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center depot operations.
Amid skepticism that privatization of the depot was not cost effective, Congressional
leaders requested a review of the interim costs associated with the Boeing Guidance
Repair Center (BGRC). The General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the cost
comparison of the previous Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center and the current
operating costs of the Boeing Guidance Repair Center. The results of the analysis
estimated that the first full year of operations at BGRC would likely cost $14.1 million
more than it would have if the facility continued to operate in its previous capacity. This
represents a 16 percent cost increase (GAO/NSIAD-98-35).
This raises the initial question of did the Air Force make a mistake in pursuing
privatization of depot operations at Newark? In a previous 1994 GAO report concerning
the cost growth of the privatization, it was identified that post-privatization operation
costs could exceed the cost of current Air Force operational costs and reduce or eliminate
the projected savings. This in turn could increase the payback period as much as over
100 years (GAO/NSIAD-95-60,1995:3). This report clearly indicated the costs
associated with privatization of the Newark depot could outweigh the benefits of
reducing the Air Force organic depot capacity. The statement, "the savings anticipated
from closing AGMC were not the most important considerations and the Air Force might

privatize AGMC even if that involved increased costs," by the Acting Secretary of Air
Force Donley, emphasized the desire to remove the Newark depot from the books of the
Air Force.
Closing AGMC also created another dilemma, for AGMC was the Air Force sole
source for the repair of inertial guidance and inertial navigation systems. The entire
workload of AGMC was considered "core work" and privatization would violate not only
the concept of core workloads but also public laws concerning the 60/40 rule (Fisher,
1996:34). Looking at this situation from the outside one could suggest there were
political powers interested in seeing the closure of Newark AFB and the privatization,
whether in place or at other organic or private facilities, of the depot maintenance to
become reality.
Why was so much effort utilized in continuing with privatization of the Newark
depot when cost analyses by the Air Force and GAO varied greatly? Could it be from
increasing political pressures for the services to reduce depot capacity, cut spending, and
to increase interservice work as suggested by the BRAC Commission (Fisher, 1996:36)?
It could also have been known that BRAC 95 would target the larger Air Logistics Center
(ALC) depots such as Sacramento ALC at McClellan AFB and San Antonio ALC at
Kelly AFB for closer and privatization and that Newark could be used as a "privatization
template."

Justification and Objectives
Several theses have already been completed on the depot privatization at Newark
AFB. These theses were accomplished during the time period leading up to the

privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark AFB and
focused on several key issues involved with the privatization of the repair depot. Now,
three years after the privatization process has been completed at Newark, it is important
to research if the depot privatization has met the goals that initiated the closure of
Newark and the privatization of the depot workload.
The objective of this research is to determine if the privatization of Newark
AFB's Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center has successfully met the goals that
initiated the privatization. The definition of successful is obviously very objective and it
usually depends on the view it is taken from. In this case study, success will focus on the
reduction of excess depot capacity and overall cost. Additional objectives of this research
will be to examine if depot operating processes or procedures have changed as a result of
the Newark depot privatization and how have performance metrics changed since a
private contractor has taken over the depot operations.

Investigative Questions
Investigative Question One. How does the privatization of the Aerospace
Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark AFB reduce the excess depot capacity within
the Air Force? The justification that both the Air Force and BRAC committee presented
in the closure recommendations was the 1.7 million hours of excess depot capacity at
Newark along with the overall 8.9 million hours of excess depot capacity Air Force wide.
Investigative Question Two. Is the contractor operated Boeing Guidance Repair
Center costlier than when the repair depot was operated by the government? If there was
a cost increase, what was it and what has been done to minimize or eliminate the excess

costs? The whole premise on closing Newark AFB and privatizing the depot workload
was to save money to be used in modernizing Air Force weapon systems.
Investigative Question Three. How did the performance metrics of the depot
maintenance repairs change under contractor operations? The "who performs better"
debate between organic depot operations and private contractor depot operations have
been in question over recent years. Analyzing the performance metrics may shed some
light on this area of debate.
Investigative Question Four. How did depot maintenance policy or procedures
change since the privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center? Since
Newark was the first Air Force depot to be privatized in place, many changes in the
overall depot system policy may have occurred.

Scope and Limitations of the Research
This thesis will specifically focus on the depot repair operations at the previous
government-controlled Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark AFB and
the current contractor repair operations at the Boeing Guidance Repair Center located at
the Central Ohio Aerospace and Technology Center (the former Newark AFB).
With the reduction in budgets across all services, "costs" have been the
determining factor on what remains organic to the Air Force and what activities are
outsourced or privatized. It is very important not only to national defense but also to the
taxpayers that money is spent where you get "the best bang for the buck." This study will
include a focus on whether the costs of contractor operation of the repair depot are more
than when the government operated it. It is important to note that when estimated costs

are used as a basis of cost and when actual costs are more, one must research if the initial
cost estimates excluded costs that are included in the actual costs.
The depot repair system was originally developed with inherent excess capacity to
handle wartime surge capacity requirements. Notwithstanding, the Air Force's goal of
reducing excess depot capacity through privatization must first reduce the capacity
requirements, then privatize to realize cost savings. This research will examine if the
excess capacity of the Air Force depot systems have been reduced through the Newark
privatization.
Closing Air Force bases across the United States has traditionally been a
painstaking process for all parties involved. United States Senators, United States
Representatives, and the local/state politicians whose governing area is affected by the
closures will usually have insight to how these decisions are made. It is practically
impossible to research the "behind the closed door" political maneuvering that occurs
when such decisions are to be made. However, the justifications that were presented in
recommending the closure of Newark AFB and the privatization of the repair depot can
be researched.
The privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark
AFB was the first Air Force depot to be privatized. It is vital for future depot
privatization considerations that repair quality and timeliness is the same as it was under
governmental controls. A focus on repair performance metrics is imperative not only for
contractor award fees but also to establish private firms can operate a depot efficiently
and effectively.

The emphasis of this thesis is concentrated on the traditional depot repair
workloads associated within the Air Force depot system. Accordingly, research into the
metrology and calibration workloads, awarded to Wyle Laboratories, which were part of
AGMC was not accomplished. However, the cost analysis comparisons of
AGMC/BRGC include Wyle Laboratories cost data to make an overall cost comparison.

II. Background of the Issue/Review of the Literature

Chapter Overview
This chapter presents reasons on why the Air Force needed force modernization
and how the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process played a major role.
Outsourcing and privatization will be examined in how these processes engaged in the
force modernization process. The chapter concludes with an overview of outsourcing and
privatization issues.

Force Modernization
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin wall, the United States won the
"Cold War" and the peace dividend of numerous years of robust defense spending paid
off. The United States no longer faces a long and protracted conflict with a rival
superpower. However, this left the US military without a visible threat and political
pressure from Washington DC to reduce the federal budget focused now on military
budgets. The need for such a large military force is often the topic of discussion among
the nation's political leaders. This ultimately led to larger budget cuts across the board
for all the services. In addition to overall budget cuts, between 1985 and 1996 the
procurement budget declined by 68 percent, in real terms, funding for modernization
programs were at very low levels (Improving the Combat Edge Through Outsourcing,
1996:2).
The US military was able to maintain the average age of most weapons systems
even though fewer systems were bought. Discarding the oldest equipment and
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redistributing newer equipment to a smaller force structure has been the theme for the
past several years. However, this "patch" for not receiving modern equipment will affect
the military in an adverse way in future years. New technology is upon us that can
dramatically increase the capabilities of our military forces. The DoD realized funding
must be increased for procurement to ensure the continued technological superiority of
the US military (Improving the Combat Edge Through Outsourcing, 1996:3).
The DoD's initial answer to meet the challenge of a reduced budget started with
reducing infrastructure costs through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.
A total of 451 military installations and activities were closed or reduced in size through
the BRAC process to date. DoD estimated the results of the four rounds of base closures
and realignments produced net savings of $14 billion and when fully implemented will
provide annual savings of $5.7 million (GAO/NSIAD-99-36,1998:4). Coupled together
with the BRAC process was a massive reduction in personnel. Personnel levels in the Air
Force have been reduced by 39 percent since 1986 and plans are for another 5 percent by
FY03 and the U.S. military as a whole has been reduced by 20 percent over the past five
years (Marley, 1998:3). Currently the Air Force is at a post WWII low in personnel
strength of 371,577 and is expected to reduce by another 12 percent by 2003 (Pulley,
1998:3).
This still was not enough to meet the needs necessary for force modernization and
readiness. According to the Secretary of Defense, if money is not saved by reducing
unnecessary infrastructure and cutting the size of the force, the services will not have the
money to develop new weapons (Maze, 1998:6). On February 26,1996, Deputy
Secretary of Defense John White issued a memorandum to all Service Secretaries to
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make outsourcing and privatization a priority within their department (Improving the
Combat Edge Through Outsourcing, 1996: Appendix 2). Consequently, a systematic
review of all infrastructure support activities was conducted to determine where
competitive forces could improve overall performance at a lower cost. The outsourcing
and privatization of these activities have offered a mechanism to generate the needed
savings for force modernization.
The questions many politicians ask is, "Why do we need to modernize the
military? Did not we prove we were superior in Desert Storm?" Without modernization
the Air Force will not have the warfighting requirements to meet the two major regional
conflict strategy in the very near future (Arana-Barradas, 1998:1). By FY99 the average
Air Force aircraft will be 20 years old, and older aircraft require more time, parts, and
people to maintain in flying condition. As an example, the F-15 fleet averages 11 years
old and the KC-135/B-52 average 35 years old. General Hawley (1997:1) summarized
the greatest modernization challenge in the years ahead may be to keep the F-22 funded
and on track to full deployment by the end of the first decade of the 21st century.
According to General Ryan, to stay on top as the preeminent air and space power in the
world, the Air Force must address the modernization of weapon systems (Air Force News
Service, 1998:1). The F-22, Joint Strike Fighter, Airborne Laser, Space Based Infrared
Systems, and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle are the weapon systems
modernization projects the Air Force is funding (Dorsey, 1998:1).
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Outsourcing and Privatization
Outsourcing and privatization are not new concepts to the military. Since 1955
federal agencies have been encouraged to obtain commercially available goods and
services from the private sector through outsourcing (GAO/NSIAD-98-62,1998:2). In
1966 the Office of Management & Budget issued Circular A-76, which establishes policy
for government's performance of commercial activities. In 1979 a supplemental
handbook was added that included procedures for competitively determining whether
commercial activities should be performed in-house, by another federal agency through
an interservice support agreement, or by the private sector. The latest version reduces
administrative activities of performing A-76 studies and makes the cost comparison
between private sector proposals and government estimates more equitable
(GAO/NSIAD-98-62,1998:19). The goal of the Air Force outsourcing and privatization
process is four-fold: to generate savings for force modernization (new weapon systems);
to improve performance, quality, and efficiency; to focus on core activities; and to sustain
readiness (Cameron, 1998).
Outsourcing is not a new term for US companies either for they have been
outsourcing activities for years. Companies report that outsourcing provides them their
desired benefits; enables a focus on core competencies; improves service quality,
responsiveness, and agility; promotes access to new technologies; and employs more
efficient business practices. These benefits are very similar to what the Air Force
developed as their outsourcing and privatization goals. A study by the Dun & Bradstreet
Corporation and The Outsourcing Institute estimates that approximately $100 billion of
outsourcing occurred in 1996 and is estimated to top $150 billion by 1998 (The
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Outsourcing Institute, 1999:1). A recent Anderson Consulting survey found that more
than 90 percent of corporate CEOs expected to be involved in strategic outsourcing by
the year 2000. The structure of choice in today's business world is a web or network, in
which companies rely on partnerships, cross investments, and strategic alliances to enter
new markets. Leading firms such as Microsoft and Cisco systems no longer create new
divisions in distant fields. Instead, they form strategic partnerships or other relationships,
such as Microsoft's investment in Comcast as part of its strategy for gaining access to the
cable market (Mclnerney, 1998:80).
Outsourcing and privatization offers the prospect of lowering costs and improving
performance across a wide range of support activities. The DoD's total budget operations
and support activities in FY96 were $93 billion. The lofty savings estimate of 31 percent
on outsourced and privatized activities has DoD leadership eager to compete out as many
support activities as possible. The goal is to reduce costs through the outsourcing and
privatization initiatives and to have a net gain in savings and performance. Activities will
only be considered for outsourcing or privatization if they meet three conditions. First,
private sector firms must be able to perform the activity and meet the military warfighting
mission. No activities will be considered for outsourcing which constitutes core
capabilities (fighters, tanks, ground forces, etc.). Second, a competitive commercial
market must exist for the activity. Market forces usually drive organizations to improve
quality, increase efficiency, and reduce costs. Third, outsourcing the activity must result
in best value for the government and therefore the U.S. taxpayer (Improving the Combat
Edge through Outsourcing, 1996:3). The Air Force is vigorously pursuing outsourcing
and privatization opportunities throughout the support infrastructure. An outsourcing
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initiative named "JUMP START" was created in November 1996 to evaluate potential
support activities to be outsourced. The popularity of outsourcing is apparent from the
total of 1,800 A-76 studies that have been accomplished in the past three years. The
outsourcing of aircraft maintenance at Columbus AFB, Mississippi; Altus AFB,
Oklahoma; Holloman AFB, New Mexico; and Reese AFB, Texas has already yielded
significant savings. The outsourcing of base operations at Tyndall AFB, Florida and
Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio is currently in planning as well as that of base supply
activities at Edwards AFB, California (Air Force Congressional Issue Papers, 1998:43).
Current interest in privatization includes military family housing and on-base utilities as
the two main target areas.

Push for Outsourcing and Privatization
Why the push on outsourcing and privatization? The military performs a wide
variety of support activities in-house that are readily available in the local communities'
private sector. Private sector organizations have market forces working against them that
require more cost effective and efficient performance then competitors. If a private
organization can do the same activity that a military organization does cheaper and more
efficiently, it only makes sense to have them perform this activity. Examples of these
activities are office and administrative services, automatic data processing, food services,
industrial shops and services, maintenance, overhaul, repair and testing, management of
support activities, and audiovisual products and services. The only activities that would
not be outsourced or privatized are those activities that are core competencies of the
military such as command of military organizations, management and supervision of
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DoD personnel, criminal investigations, revenue disbursements, and control of federal
funds (Commercial Activities Program, 1998:2-3).
The Air Force manages the outsourcing efforts within the Air Force Commercial
Activities (CA) Program. The process of outsourcing or privatizing an activity starts with
an A-76 study. The Office of Management and Budget Circular (OMBC) A-76,
Performance of Commercial Activities, lays out the policy and procedures that must be
followed in conducting cost comparisons. In competing a depot repair workload against
the organic and private sectors, the Depot Maintenance Council's Cost Comparability
Handbook (CCH) lays out the procedures in making an award determination.

Privatization Defined
Privatization is the transfer of control of a support activity entirely to a private
sector. The government divests itself of the entire process including all assets. The
government specifies the specific quantity, quality, and timeliness requirement; however,
it has no control over the operation of the activity. Another key aspect is that the
government may not be the only customer to the service provider. An example of
privatization could be in vehicle maintenance. If a base privatized a vehicle maintenance
activity, they may simply take their vehicle to the local General Motors or Ford
dealership and have the vehicles worked on. Currently there are two areas in the Air
Force that have plans to be privatized, military housing and base utilities. The Air Force
awarded a $42.6 million lease to Landmark Organization of Austin, TX to design,
construct, own, operate, and manage at its expense a new 420-unit rental housing
development to serve enlisted families at Lackland AFB. Rent for the housing units will
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be capped at the basic allowance for housing (BAH) for the respective enlisted personnel.
Ground breaking occurred in the fall of 1998 with a fall 2000 completion date. To date
the construction costs are estimated to be 11.7 million less then if the housing was
constructed through the normal Military Construction (MILCON) process (Dishner,
1999:1). Privatization-in-place refers to privatizing the activity at the same location as it
was before. In the case of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center, the workload
repair remained the same facility and location.

Outsourcing Defined
Outsourcing is the competing of support services to public and private industry.
The government retains full ownership and control over the operation of the services
provided. The primary method to follow in outsourcing is to compare the cost of inhouse to contractor performance cost to determine the most effective and efficient mode
of operation. An example of outsourcing, using a base vehicle maintenance activity: If a
vehicle maintenance activity were outsourced, the contracted firm would use government
facilities and equipment, as designated by the contract requirements, but service only
government vehicles.

Reasoning for Outsourcing/Privatization
Accelerated reengineering benefits are one of the most valuable results of
outsourcing or privatization. Reengineering aims for improvements in critical
performance measures such as cost, quality, quantity, and timeliness. The need to
increase efficiencies in non-core activities can come in conflict with the need to invest
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efforts into the core competency activities. As non-core support activities are continually
placed on the "back burner", these activities become less efficient and non-productive.
By outsourcing these non-core activities to a world class provider, an organization (DoD)
can possible reap the benefits of reengineering. Access to world class capabilities is
another result of outsourcing or privatization. World class service providers make
extensive investments in technology, methodologies, and personnel. They gain expertise
by working with and competing against market forces. The combination of specialization
and expertise gives customers a competitive advantage and helps avoid the cost of
chasing technology. Cash infusion is one the most important reasons that the DoD is
advocating outsourcing and privatization. Outsourcing and privatization often involve
the transfer of assets to the service provider thus providing significant cash infusion to the
customer. Outsourcing and privatization will free resources for other purposes. Every
organization has a limit on available resources (The Outsourcing Institute, 1999). In the
case of the DoD, the freed up resource of personnel was actually made into a manpower
reduction to capitalize again on reducing costs. If an activity were difficult to manage or
out of control, outsourcing would be an option for addressing this issue. Outsourcing and
privatization will improve an organization's strategic focus. By devoting energy to areas
that are not the military's true expertise, focus can be concentrated on the core
competencies. Outsourcing and privatization can also make capital funds available. It is
hard in today's tight budget to justify capital investments in non-core activities.

Navy Depot Outsourcing
A BRAC 93 recommendation resulted in the closing of the Alameda Naval
Aviation Depot, California. The maintenance workloads performed at their facilities
were redistributed to remaining depots operated by the Navy and other services. It has
been determined in a GAO report to the U.S Senate (GAO/NSIAD-98-10BR. 1998:1) the
transfer of the Alameda's depot maintenance to other depots was not accomplished in the
most effective manner. Production delays, increased costs, and an impact on customer
unit readiness resulted. The delays and increased costs were attributed to a variety of
factors including competing priorities between the gaining and losing facilities and
unidentified equipment and retooling requirements. Lack of spare parts, outdated
technical data, personnel and equipment certification requirements, and a shortfall in
skilled workers also contributed to a cost overrun. Lessons learned from this have been
shared among services that are also outsourcing depot maintenance.

Marine Corps Outsourcing
Time Mirror Training in support of the U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting is a success
story in outsourcing. Time Mirror Training, a world-class provider of training and
consulting solutions in the area of sales, leadership, and customer service has provided
the USMC a valuable service. Learning International, the performance arm of Time
Mirror Training, assists the USMC recruiting command by teaching its Professional
Selling Skills System (PSSS) to the Marine Corps recruiters. They also performed the
train-the-trainer function in instructing recruiters how to teach PSSS. A very successful
"Transformation" television advertising campaign was augmented by Learning
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International. Efforts to move a manual system to laptop computers so recruiters can
more efficiently manage their work process, daily schedules, and routinely needed
information to do their daily jobs are in the works. Major General Kimp, Commander of
the Marine Corp Recruiting command, stated that the results of Learning International is
a meritorious unit commendation the unit received for exceeding recruiting requirements
for 24 consecutive months (Learning International, 1998:1-3).

Navy Outsourcing Problem
Outsourcing in the Navy was plagued with personnel difficulties in 1997. In a
GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-98-107, 1998:2) to Congress, it was identified that
outsourcing was impacting rotational assignments in the Navy. Sea-to-shore rotations are
set to four years at sea for every three years on shore. Actual sea-to-shore rotations have
ranged up to five years at sea for every three years on shore. As of February 1998, the
number of sea billets exceeded shore billets by more then 40,000. Outsourcing of support
activities on shore has made a direct effect on the years sailors spend out at sea. Several
Navy A-76 studies for FY98 focused on eliminating military billets in areas where
rotational shortages exist for personnel returning from sea duty. As a result, the Navy
decided not to begin some of these A-76 studies. According to OMBC A-76, government
personnel must perform functions that are closely related to the exercise of national
defense and that any warfighting capability. DoD has released guidance that one such
function are the positions that are required to support rotational requirements for active
duty enlisted military personnel returning from overseas assignment or sea duty
(GAO/NSIAD-98-107,1998:6).
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New Weapon Systems to the Private Sector
In March 1998 a GAO report identified a DoD trend in shifting depot workload
on new weapon systems and major upgrades to private sector contractors (GAO/NSAID98-8,1998:2). This condition reflects the DoD's shift from past policies and practices,
which generally preferred the organic public sector. The important underlining dilemma
caused by this concerns the workload at existing DoD depot facilities. The workload at
existing depots will eventually decline over time with the phase out of major weapon
systems. Combined with the trend in awarding new weapon systems to private
contractors, this will cause an increase of excess capacity at the remaining DoD depots.
If this trend continues, the remaining organic depot operations DoD wide will increase in
excess workload capacity and may be in jeopardy of possible closure recommendations.
This is important to note, because excess workload capacity was the justification used to
recommend closure of Newark AFB and the privatization of the repair depot.

Privatization-in-Place Plans Are Costly While Excess Capacity Exists
In 1993 the justification to close Newark was the 1.7 million hours of excess
depot capacity at the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center and 8.9 million hours of
excess Air Force depot capacity. The problems of excess capacity have been exacerbated
in recent years by reductions in military force structure and related weapon system
procurement; changes in military operational requirements due to the end of the Cold
War; increased reliability, maintainability, and durability of military systems; increased
maintenance performed in operational units; and increased privatization of depot
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maintenance workloads (GAO/NSAID-97-13,1996:3). Table 1 (GAO/NSAID-97-13,
1996:7) illustrates the excess capacity at Air Force depots in 1996.
The 1995 BRAC process identified the Sacramento Air Logistics Center (ALC) at
McClellan AFB and the San Antonio Air Logistics Center (ALC) at Kelly AFB to be
closed and consolidated with the Air Force remaining depots and private contractors.
However, the President forwarded the recommendation to Congress to privatize-in-place

Table 1. Workload Capacity in Direct Labor Hours

Depot
Oklahoma City
Ogden
San Antonio
Sacramento
Warner Robins
Total

Maximum
Capacity
12,863,153
9,004,515
15,219,752
10,226,981
9,912,789
57,227,190

Actual
Workload
7,058,083
5,146,999
6,372,607
5,509,051
7,375,889
31,462,629

Excess Capacity
Percentage
Hours
45
5,805,070
43
3,857,516
58
8,847,145
46
4,717,930
26
2,536,900
45
25,764,561

or in the local community, the ALCs. This recommendation was based on the potential
effects on the local communities and Air Force readiness. After further study by the
GAO it was reported that privatization-in-place does not substantially reduce
infrastructure costs and excess capacity. Privatization-in-place simply moves the excess
capacity to the private sector. The GAO stated the privatization-in-place of the
Sacramento and San Antonio depots does will not reduce the large amount of excess
capacity in the Air Force depot system (GAO/NSAID-97-13, 1996:2).
As cost analysis and reports on the Sacramento and San Antonio ALCs surfaced,
the logical choice became clear to consolidate a majority of the workloads to the
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remaining Air Force depots. The nuclear weapons workload moved from San Antonio
ALC to Ogden ALC and was completed in December 1998; the F100 Core engine
workload move to Oklahoma City ALC is to be completed in 1999; C-5 workload was
awarded to Warner Robins ALC in October 1997 and transition of the workload was
completed August 1998 (Defense Depot Maintenance Council, 1997:15). The F-15
workload transition from Sacramento ALC to Warner Robins ALC was completed 5
August 1998. A consolidated workload package that includes the KC-135, A-10,
hydraulics, electrical accessories, instruments, and manufacturing was award to Ogden,
which was in-turn subcontracted to Boeing (Defense Depot Maintenance Council,
1997:16).

Navy Depot Maintenance
The 1995 BRAC process recommended closing the Navy's Louisville depot and
transferring the workload to several other DoD facilities. The city of Louisville proposed
the depot to be considered for privatization-in-place. After a second look and some
previously unforeseen transfer costs, privatization-in-place was determined it would be
more cost effective for repair of the depot workload. Consequently, the workload,
equipment, and facilities were transferred to the private sector. After several years
operating under contractor control, the privatization of the Louisville depot facility did
not appear to be the most cost effective approach. It was identified that the Norfolk
Naval Shipyard and Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center could have received the
Louisville workloads due to 8.9 million hours of excess direct labor capacity at the
Norfolk facilities (GAO/NSAID-97-52,1997:4).
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Core Logistics Capability
The most basic of the legislative mandates governing the performance of depotlevel workloads is 10 U.S.C. 2464, which provides for a core logistics capability to be
identified by the Secretary of Defense and maintained by DoD unless the Secretary
claims DoD performance as not required for national defense. Traditionally, core was
defined as the capability, including personnel, equipment, and facilities, to ensure timely
response to a mobilization, national contingency, or other emergency requirement. The
composition and size of this core capability are at the heart of the depot maintenance
public-private mix debate (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-148,1996:3). All of the depot repair
workload at Newark had been previously identified as core with the remaining Air Force
depots core workload at fifty nine to eighty four percent (GAO/NSAID-95-60,1994:5).
During the closure and privatization process of Newark AFB and the Aerospace
Guidance and Metrology Center, a lawsuit was filed to stop the privatization. The
American Federation of Government Employees alleged the privatization violated the
Federal law requiring core workloads to be preformed at government facilities (Fisher,
1996:2).

Impetus to Close Newark
The first mass effort to close and consolidate military bases came in 1988 when
the first round of base closures occurred, commonly referred to as BRAC 88. During this
closure round the Army and Navy slated to close several of their depots. However, the
Air Force did not present any Air Force depots to be closed. After glowing reports of
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how successful BRAC 88 was it was determined that three more rounds of base closures
would occur in 1991,1993 and 1995.
In building the 1992 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) the Air Staff built
in provisions for base closures and Newark AFB was the target. Initial targets indicated
it would cost roughly $60 million to close Newark using the Cost of Base Realignment
Action (COBRA) model. However, further analysis determined the COBRA model was
for estimating closure costs at a typical fighter, bomber, or other type of flying operation
base and not of a base supporting a depot facility. The model didn't take into account the
mission infrastructure with a depot repair base like Newark's. Most flying bases were
designed to be easily mobile and not fixed in place like depots. Because a typical flying
base is designed to be moved or deployed, the transportation and transition costs are
significantly less then at a depot. Because the Air Staff used the COBRA model to
estimate the costs of closing Newark, the estimates were largely understated. After
modifications to the COBRA model it was estimated to cost $256 million to close
Newark and move the depot workload to another location (Carlin, 1997:2-5). This
increase in closure costs kept Newark off the 1991 BRAC list. Twelve defense depots
were closed or realigned under the BRAC process of 1988,1991 and 1993 and only one,
Newark, by the Air Force was closed (Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business
Plan, 1997: 15).
The 1993 report to the President from the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission justified that closure of Newark AFB would reduce the Air Force excess
depot capacity by 1.7 million Direct Production Actual Hours (DPAH). The report also
identified the Air Force had a total excess depot capacity of 8.7 million DPAH. The
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reduction of excess depot capacity was also consistent with Secretary of Defense
guidance concerning DOD depots (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission,
1993:81).

AFIT Theses on Newark/AGMC
Several theses have already been accomplished on the privatization of the
Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark AFB. Captain Paul Pidgeon's
thesis examined the effect of the privatization on the local community. This thesis
delicately presented a chronological history of all the issues involved in the privatization
process. Captain James Valley's thesis examined the contract types and contractor
incentive issues involved in the privatization. His thesis concentrated on what incentives
predicted what types of contracts are awarded to contractors. Finally, Captain Mark
Luttschwager's thesis examined the organizational structure when the government
operation changed to a civilian contractor.
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III. Methodology
Introduction
This chapter describes the research objectives along with the intent and goals of
each investigative question. The case study method of researching is examined followed
by discussing data collection, data analysis, and data validity.

Research Objectives
The intention of this research is to determine if the privatization of the Aerospace
Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark AFB has met the goals set forth in the
justification to privatize the depot repair operations.
The costs associated with the privatization are also very important to this
investigation.

The whole basis of the privatization-in-place concept was that it would be

cheaper than other alternatives. When taxpayers' dollars are spent to make a process, in
this case depot repair, more economical, it is important to examine if cost savings have
materialized.
Investigating the changes and impact in depot policy and procedures resulting
from the increased emphasis on privatization are very important in future depot
privatization recommendations and public versus private depot competitions.
Finally, the performance metrics and the contract award fee trends are important
to analyze to determine if the private contractor operations are more efficient than when
the depot was under government control.
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Method
According to Robert K. Yin, case studies are the preferred strategy when "how"
or "why" questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events,
and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with some real-life context (Yin,
1994:1). The case study approach was used because the researcher wanted to know
"how" privatizing the depot repair at Newark would reduce the excess depot capacity in
the Air Force. Additionally, Dane defines archival research as any research in which
public record is the unit of analysis (Dane, 1990:169). The author used a combination of
these two methods in researching the privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and
Metrology Center.

Research Approach
To examine the full extent of this research, data were gathered and analyzed to
address each of the investigative questions. Each investigative question is restated with
the question intent identified, followed by the documentation and organization contacted.

Investigative Question One
How does the privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at
Newark AFB reduce the excess depot capacity within the Air Force? The intent of this
question is to discern if privatizing the depot workload operations actually reduced the
excess depot capacity at Newark and the Air Force. The goal was to determine if excess
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depot capacity was reduced, increased, or remained the same as a result of the
privatization.
The first step was to review the justifications and recommendations made by the
Air Force and the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission concerning the
Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center and Newark AFB. This information was
obtained through the 1993 Report to the President from the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission.
The second step was to obtain workload and capacity data for the depot repair
operations at the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center. The time period for the
repair data should encompass several years before and after the privatization. The Joint
Depot Maintenance Activities Group and HQ Air Force Materials Command, Depot
Maintenance Division provided workload and capacity data.

Investigative Question Two
Is the contractor-operated Boeing Guidance Repair Center more costly to operate
than when the government operated the repair depot? If there was a cost increase, what
was it and what has been done to minimize or eliminate the excess costs?
The intent of this question was to determine if operating costs are greater or less
after the depot privatization. The goal was to ascertain if the private contractor was
operating the depot at a less cost to the taxpayers compared to when the operations were
under government control.
The first step was to identify the costs associated with operating the repair depot
while under government control. HQ AFMC Financial Management Division
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accomplished this as part of the privatization process. This cost data was paramount to
the privatization process for it was used by the government to compare contractor bid
proposals.
The second step was to identify the costs associated with operating the repair
depot while under private contractor control. This was accomplished by data obtained
from HQ AFMC/FM, Ogden ALC/FM, and Oklahoma ALC/FM.

Investigative Question Three
How did the performance metrics trends change after the private contractor took
control over the depot repair operations?
The intent of this question is to determine if the private contractor provided the
same, if not better, level of quality and delivery timeliness as when the depot was under
government control. The goal is to determine if operations under contractor control are
more or less effective then the operations under government control.

Investigative Question Four
How did depot maintenance policy or procedures change since the privatization of
the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center?
The intent of this question is to identify what depot maintenance policy or
procedural changes have occurred as a result of the privatization process. The goal is to
determine if any legal statutes governing depot operations changed or if new policies
were created to govern contractor operated depots.
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Initially, a review of depot policies and procedures governing depot operations
before the privatization was conducted. This data was obtained from researching the
Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan in the years previous to the Newark
depot privatization. Secondly, a review of the Defense Depot Maintenance Council
Business Plan for the years following the privatization along with an interview with Mr.
Tom Gordon, Joint Depot Maintenance Activities Group was conducted.

Data Collection
Yin identifies six sources of evidence that are used in case studies: documents,
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical
artifacts (Yin, 1994:78). In this case study, official documentations, archival records, and
interviews served as the sources of evidence.
In addition to the attention given to these individual sources, some over-riding
principles are important to any data collection effort when conducting case studies.
These include the use of: (a) multiple sources of evidence, that is, evidence from two or
more sources, but converging on the same set of facts or findings; (b) a case study
database, that is, a formal assembly of evidence distinct from the final case study report;
and (c) a chain of evidence, that is, explicit links between the question asked, the data
collected, and the conclusion drawn. The incorporation of these principles into a case
study investigation will increase its quality substantially (Yin, 1994:78).
In addressing Yin's first principle of multiple sources of evidence, the author was
able to extract data from the AGMC closeout history, GAO reports, and a report to the
President from the Defense Realignment and Closure Commission that converged on the
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same justifications used in the recommendation to close Newark AFB. Triangulation is
the rationale for using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994:91) that provides for
converging lines of inquiry which produces more convincing and accurate findings (Yin,
1994:92).
Yin's second principle of a formal database of evidence distinct from the final
case study report is outside the scope of this research. However, the AGMC closeout
history that was conducted by the HQ AFMC Historian Office fits this principle. The
AGMC closeout history contains an enormous wealth of information from hundreds of
sources that includes six volumes of documentation.
Yin's third principle of a chain of evidence that links the questions asked, data
collected, and conclusions drawn are laid out in the investigative questions asked in
chapter one, findings in chapter four, and conclusions and recommendations in chapter
five.
The author conducted interviews in person and obtained information via
electronic mail with Oklahoma City ALC, Ogden ALC, and HQ AFMC personnel. Mr.
Bill Pitts at Ogden was instrumental in obtaining information regarding the performance
metrics and award fee reports. Mr. Pitts also contributed considerable guidance in
analyzing this data.
Mr. Scott Debanto, a cost analyst, from HQ AFMC provided the finalized AFMC
FY 97 cost comparability study of organic versus contractor operation of AGMC. This
cost study provided an enormous amount of information pertaining to the costs associated
with the privatization process.
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The author researched data contained in the AGMC closeout history provided by
the HQ AFMC Historian Office as background data to trace the privatization process
from start to finish. The data provided insight to critical areas concerning the initial
justification to close Newark AFB and to privatize the depot workload.

Data Analysis
Data analysis is one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of
conducting a case study (Yin, 1994:102). Much analysis depends on the researcher's
own style of rigorous thinking along with the sufficient presentation of evidence and
consideration of alternative interpretations (Yin, 1994:103). In conducting this case
study, the author examined the first two investigative questions based on a form of initial
official public document. The data were analyzed pertaining to how the actual outcome
differed from what was initially planned.
One of the general analytical strategies proposed by Yin is to develop a
descriptive framework for organizing the case study (Yin, 1994:104). This case study
essentially employs the descriptive analytical approach in answering the investigative
questions. For example, the investigative question concerning the cost analysis describes
what factors have contributed to the increased costs associated with contractor depot
repairs.
In researching, analyzing, and reporting topics in an academic environment a
common theme is how can your research be generalized to other areas? In general, case
study designs should be considered when a researcher is interested only in the specific
individual serving as the participant. In this case, it is the privatization of depot repair
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workloads at Newark AFB. Similarly, conclusions drawn from a case study should be
limited to that participant. Although it is possible to generalize from a case study, it is
often unwise to do so. The major assumption underlying the generalization is that the
research participant represents the individual to whom the generalization is applied, and a
single participant rarely represents any larger group (Dane, 1990:114). In this case study
concerning the privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark
AFB, the author makes no generalizations that should be applied to the remaining Air
Force depots. The complex nature of the depot product mixes and unique workloads
make it very difficult and unpractical to suggest any generalizations between the
privatization of Newark and other ongoing Air Force depot privatization issues.

Data Validity
In this research the author employed the triangulation principal of multiple
sources to each area of investigation. An important advantage presented by using
multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging lines of inquiry. Thus any
finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if
it is based on several different sources of information (Yin, 1994:92). For example, the
depot capacity and workload data obtained from HQ AFMC/LGP matched the data
obtained from the Joint Depot Maintenance Activities Group data as well as published
data contained in the Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan for the fiscal
years studied. Additionally, interviews and correspondence from multiple people
involved in the privatization process came to the same conclusions on several issues.
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The potential problems of construct validity can be addressed through the use of
triangulation. The multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of
the same phenomenon, thus increasing construct validity (Yin, 1994:92).
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IV. Results and Analysis

Introduction
The objective of this research is to examine if the privatization of the Aerospace
Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark AFB has met expectations as set forth in the
initial justification to close the repair depot, examine whether the depot operations are
costlier under a private contractor, examine performance metrics of the depot operations
under the private contractor, and examine how the depot policies have changed.
To accomplish this, the researcher has evaluated written documents contained in
the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center closeout history, General Accounting
Office reports, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission report to the
President, correspondence with defense depot management personnel and reviewed
documented interviews with key personnel involved in the privatization process. This
chapter presents the data collected from personal interviews, correspondence with HQ
AFMC/FM, Ogden ALC and JDMAG personnel, and the Aerospace Guidance and
Metrology Center closeout history.

Excess Depot Capacity
How did the privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at
Newark AFB reduce the excess depot capacity within the Air Force?
Analysis of actual capacity and excess capacity of the Aerospace Guidance and
Metrology Center depot was investigated. Table 2 (JDMAG and AFMC/LGP, 1999)
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illustrates the Newark depot actual workload and capacity for FY 86 through FY 96 at the
Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center.

Table 2. AGMC Workload and Capacity Hours

Workload
Capacity
Capacity Util. %

FY96
FY94
FY92
FY95
FY93
FY91
612,000 679,000 899,000 1,128,000 1,232,000 1,666,000
890,000 1,062,000 1,150,000 1,468,000 1,643,000 1,597,000
0.69
0.64
0.78
0.77
0.75
1.04

FY90
FY89
FY87
FY88
FY86
Workload
2,141,000 1,832,000 1,884,000 1,854,000 1,847,000
Capacity
1,801,000 1,997,000 1,348,000 1,347,000 1,336,000
Capacity Util. %
1.19
0.92
1.40
1.38
1.38

The data clearly indicate a large flaw in the assumption that closing Newark's
depot would reduce the overall depot excess capacity. These figures illustrate that
Newark's excess capacity was only a small percentage of the overall depot capacity.
For example, in FY 92 the excess capacity was 411,000 hours which is far from the 1.7
million hours that was identified as excess.
Wally Horton, a key player in the privatization of Newark, identified this to the
Jim Courter, Chairman of the Base Closure Executive Group (Horton, 1993). Jim Courter
wrote a letter to James Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Installations, asking the question how the closure of Newark's depot would solve the
depot excess capacity problem (Courter, 1993). James Boatright, with the assurance
from the HQ US AF that closing the depot at Newark would rid the. Air Force of 1.7
million DPAH (Boatright, 1993).
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In the 1994 GAO report that examined cost growth and other factors affecting the
privatization of Newark, the question was broached concerning the excess capacity of the
depot. The GAO reported it was difficult to understand how the Air Force was going to
eliminate the 1.7 million DP AH of excess capacity and goes as far to say the privatization
of Newark would not reduce excess depot capacity (GAO/NSAID-95-60,1995:9). The
Air Force responded to the GAO report and clarified that the privatization of Newark's
depot did not affect excess depot capacity, however, the Air Force could reduce its
organic depot capacity by 1.7 million DP AH (HQ USAF/LG, 1995). This response by
HQ USAF/LG was in direct contradiction for which the entire justification of closing the
Newark depot was based.
An aggregate comparison of depot workload and capacity between the Aerospace
Guidance and Metrology Center and the San Antonio Air Logistics Center is illustrated in
table 3 (JDMAG and AFMC/LGP, 1999).

Table 3. San Antonio ALC and AGMC Workload and Capacity Hours
San Antonio Air Logistics Center
Workload/Capacity Data

Hours in (000)

Workload
Capacity
Capacity Util. %

FY91
8585
8935
0.96

FY90
9640
8859
1.09

FY89
11016
8859
1.24

FY88
8371
12908
0.65

FY87
8648
12908
0.67

FY86
10910
12993
0.84

Total
57170
65462
0.87

FY86
1847
1336
1.38

Total
11224
9426
1.19

Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center
Workload/Capacity Data

Workload
Capacity
Capacity Util. %

FY91
1666
1597
1.04

FY90
2141
1801
1.19

FY89
1832
1997
0.92
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FY88
1884
1348
1.40

FY87
1854
1347
1.38

The data reveal over a six-year time period that the San Antonio depot had far
more excess capacity than the Newark depot. Based on the results of this data, it can be
suggested that the closure of Newark AFB and the privatization of the Aerospace
Guidance and Metrology Center were not focused on reducing excess depot capacity.

Costs of the Privatization-In-Place
Is the contractor operated Boeing Guidance Repair Center more costly than when
the government operated the repair depot? If there was a cost increase, what was it and
what has been done to minimize or eliminate the excess costs?
Air Force Materiel Command completed in an interim cost analysis comparing
the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center and the Boeing Guidance Repair Center
in July 1997. The analysis was included in the 1997 GAO report Analysis of Aircraft and
Missile Guidance System Depot Repair Costs. Table 4 (GAO/NSAID-98-35,1997:23)
illustrates the analysis of the cost comparison. Using the most likely data, it is estimated
to cost an additional $14.1 million to operate the depot maintenance repair operations
under the private contractor's control.
The cost analysis referenced by GAO identified three major factors that have led
to increased costs at the BGRC facility. These factors are material costs, contract
administration and oversight, and contract award fee.
Material Costs. Increased material consumption by Boeing has contributed to an
estimated $5.5 million in increased costs. The Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) was
asked by AFMC to determine Boeing's actual material usage. At the time AFAA made
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several observations. First, Boeing's inventory records were not complete or accurate to
determine the total value of on hand inventory or inventory usage. Boeing appeared to

Table 4. GAO Interim Cost Analysis Summaries

Missiles AGMC
Missiles BGRC
Difference
Aircraft AGMC
Aircraft BGRC
Difference
Metrology AGMC
Metrology BGRC
Difference
Total AGMC
Total BGRC
Total Difference

Most Likely Pessimistic
Optimistic
42,993,855 41,154,587 40,512,943
43,527,092 45,509,268 51,321,727
4,354,681 10,808,784
533,237
37,147,039
39,920,618
2,773,579

34,386,422
42,380,471
7,994,049

33,271,371
50,710,634
17,439,263

9,529,315
9,654,497
125,182

8,671,675
10,453,622
1,781,947

8,196,359
11,982,424
3,786,065

89,670,209
93,102,207
3,431,998

84,212,684 81,980,673
98,343,361 114,014,785
14,130,677 32,034,112

have a greater amount of government furnished material than necessary for existing
needs. Also, items to be repaired have been misclassified as government furnished
material. The AFAA suggested that two factors would inhibit the ability to reconcile the
physical inventory with the inventory records. First, Boeing accepted the transfer of
material inventory from the Air Force without the Air Force performing a physical
inventory. Both the Air Force and Boeing agreed to the acceptance without inventory
when the workload transferred from the government to Boeing. However, Boeing
disputes the accuracy of the Air Force's inventory transfer documents. Second, Boeing
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assumed control over stock already issued to the floor, used for work-in-progress, which
was not on Air Force inventory records (GAO/NSAID-98-35,1997:7).
The Air Force Audit Agency conducted a follow-on audit concerning the material
issues at the Boeing Guidance Repair Center and reported the findings in an August 1998
report. This report focused on two areas, material management oversight and
government material access controls. According to the report, Ogden and Oklahoma City
ALCs material managers did not maintain adequate government furnished material
(GFM) inventory visibility to accomplish up-front contractor requisition reviews.
Specifically, the material managers did not receive inventory data for residual GFM
amounting to $114.7 million that was provided to Boeing (Air Force Audit Agency,
1998:1).
Table 5 (Air Force Audit Agency, 1998:2) illustrates examples of the inventory
differences between what the material managers at the ALCs had on their records and
what Boeing inventory stock records where. This table clearly exemplifies the huge
discrepancies of the inventory levels there was concerning materials. This table also is
only an example often items in a system that contains 11,452 national stock numbers.
In an interview with Mr. Jerry Pratt, Program Integrator at Defense Contracting
Management Command Dayton-Newark, it was identified that most of the initial material
problems have been corrected. After the transition to Boeing, personnel responsible for
ordering material would requisition from inventory "one unit" of an item to find out later
that "one unit" consisted often or maybe one-hundred units. This type of ordering error
can rapidly drive up the materials costs when high dollar items are involved.
Additionally, because a complete inventory of materials was not accomplished
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Table 5. ALC/BGRC Inventory Differences

National
Stock Number
5962 01 208 8560
5305 01 254 6727
5962 01 209 9072
5305 01 254 0415
5962 01 192 5453
5930 00 870 2640
6105 00 210 8441
5945 01 333 6361
6615 01 006 5236
6615 00 715 3265

ALCs
BGRC
Inventory
Balance
1
7
1
56
2
77
40
0
0
7

BGRC
Unit
Inventory
Cost
Balance
$116.06
3,744
126.25
1,534
238.57
1,196
9.56
753
208.90
14,200
332.88
250
134.30
111
171.83
49
593.64
523
2,341.91
49

Total
Cost
$ 434,529
$ 193,668
$ 285,330
$
7,199
$ 2,966,380
$
83,220
$
14,907
$
8,420
$ 310,474
$ 114,754
$4,418,879

during the transition phase, materials were ordered even though they were on-hand but
storage location was unknown - which were later found (Pratt, 1999). Subsequently,
Boeing notified the AFAA that 2,978 requisitions valued at $17.4 million were
recognized as errors and canceled (Air Force Audit Agency, 1998:6).
Procedures requiring Boeing to identify residual materials was not required by the
initial contract. The contract has since been amended to include the collection and
reporting of inventory for all government furnished material left in place after the
privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center.
Computer interface limitations kept ALC managers from retaining visibility over
what total item balances were and where at BGRC these items were located. This enabled
Boeing personnel to requisition material in excess quantities to actual repair
requirements. In a sample of seventeen national stock numbers (NSN), in which the ALC
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materials managers allowed Boeing to requisition valued at $70,358, it was identified
excess quantities of these NSNs were already on-hand (Air Force Audit Agency, 1998:2).
This was caused by the validation of material request at the Federal Stock Class (FSC)
level by AFMC financial management personnel. The practice of validating at the FSC
level was cited as the labor-intensive hours that would have been spent on manually
loading the massive quantities of national stock numbers. New procedures and an
automated system have since been implemented for editing Boeing's government
furnished materials requests (Air Force Audit Agency, 1998:5).
Contract Oversight and Administration Costs. Contract oversight and
administration costs have been identified as an area of increased cost, $3.4 million, by the
previously mentioned GAO report (GAO/NSAID-98-35,1997:9). These costs are
included due to a "leveling" effect needed to compare government organic public
facilities against private contractors. The Defense Depot Maintenance Council's Cost
Comparability Handbook (1998:23) identifies that contract oversight and administration
costs must be included when competing depot repair workloads against a public or
private contract.
The inclusion of the contract oversight and administrations costs are added
because the contract to Boeing required oversight from three entities: the Defense
Contract Management Command (DCMC), the Ogden Air Logistic Center's program
office, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) (GAO/NSAID-98-35,1997:9).
The final FY 97 cost comparability studies of AGMC versus BGRC completed by
Ogden, Oklahoma City, and Warner Robins ALCs identify the contract oversight and
administration costs have increased to $4.3 million. Appendix A (Ogden Air Logistics
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Center, 1998) illustrates the total cost comparability of AGMC/BGRC for Ogden missile
repair costs. Appendix B (Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, 1998) illustrates the total
cost comparability of AGMC/BGRC for Oklahoma City aircraft repair costs. Appendix
C (Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, 1998) illustrates the cost comparability of
AGMC/Wyle Laboratories privatization costs.
There is nothing that can be rectified to reduce the additional cost of contract
oversight and administration. This is considered a cost of privatization that must be
included to make a comparison between organic and private depot repairs.
Contract Award Fee Costs. Contract award fee costs have been identified as an
area of increased cost of $5.2 million. This cost was first included as a cost element by a
joint memorandum from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force for
Acquisitions and Financial Management in December 1996 (GAO/NSAID-98-35,
1997:9). The January 1998 revised cost comparability specifically identifies that
contract award fee must be included in cost comparisons (Defense Depot Maintenance
Council Cost Comparability Handbook, 1998:24). Again, as with contract oversight and
administration costs, there is nothing that can be rectified to reduce contract award fee
costs associated with the privatization. These costs must be included to make a
reasonable cost comparison between the organic and private workload costs. Table 6
(OO-ALC, OC-ALC, WR-ALC Cost Studies, 1998) illustrates an overall cost
comparability of the privatization of the AGMC repair depot workload at Newark AFB
versus the private contract performed there by Boeing.
These data indicate that it will cost American taxpayers $16.7 million, or 21
percent more, to have a private contractor operate the repair depot than when the
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government organically operated the repair depot. Add in the estimated sum of $53
million in Newark AFB closing costs and costs associated in privatizing AGMC (Fisher,
1996:202), this privatization effort has cost taxpayers almost $70 million more then if the
depot repair facility would have remained organic to the Air Force.

Table 6. AGMC/BGRC FY97 Cost Comparability Summary

Missies AGMC
Missies BGRC
Difference
Percent Delta

Optimistic
31,980,617
38,775,861
6,795,244
21.25

Most Likely
33,878,964
41,046,491
7,167,527
21.16

Pessimistic
37,225,205
45,103,128
7,877,923
21.16

Aircraft AGMC
Aircraft BGRC
Difference
Percent Delta

40,322,625
44,023,213
3,700,588
9.18

37,502,063
45,205,237
7,703,174
20.54

36,392,388
48,073,915
11,681,527
32.10

Metrology AGMC
Metrology BGRC
Difference
Percent Delta

9,705,508
10,722,795
1,017,287
10.48

8,837,239
10,722,795
1,885,556
21.34

8,344,290
10,722,795
2,378,505
28.50

Total AGMC
Total BGRC
Total Difference
Percent Delta

82,008,750
93,521,869
11,513,119
14.04

80,218,266
96,974,523
16,756,257
20.89

81,961,883
103,899,838
21,937,955
26.77

A significant aspect of the entire privatization process that has been overlooked is
the initial cost estimates that determined privatization could save $5 million a year. The
pre-contract cost award analysis conducted by AFMC in 1995 that, in essence, continued
the privatization of the AGMC is nowhere to be found (GAO/NSAID-98-35,1997:5).
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The lost AFMC cost analysis report leads to questioning if all the needed cost estimates
and factors were included in this analysis.
The intent of the BRAC process is to close or realign military activities that will
result in savings to the government and, in-turn, the taxpayer. However, this may not
have been the case with Newark AFB. In correspondence with Lt Col Paul Stipe, a key
player in the AGMC privatization acquisition process, it was conveyed that saving money
was not a top priority in the privatization process. The author asked Lt Col Stipe if the
privatization in place was in the name of saving money. The response was, "Yes, BRAC
was intended to save money. However, when I started to develop the strategy for
privatizing Newark AFB, and I took our strategy to the AFMC/CC (Gen Yates), the very
clear statement we were told was that, "This is not about saving money. It is about
closing a base" (Stipe, 1999).

Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center Performance Metrics
What were the performance metrics trends before the privatization of the
Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center? Performance metrics of the AGMC are
evaluated under the performance criteria outlined in the Handbook for Depot
Maintenance Operations Indicators. Tables 7-12 illustrate the performance metrics
of AGMC over a four-year time period of FY 92-95.
Throughput and Operating Expense. The data presented in Table 7 (Depot
Maintenance Operations Indicators, 1999) represent two performance measures,
throughput and operating expense. The measurement of throughput is vital because it to
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determines if an organization is growing or shrinking. In addition, throughput is essential
to the survival of an organization, and the goal of this objective is for increased
throughput (Handbook for Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators, 1997:3-2). The
data in Table 7 (Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators, 1999) suggest the throughput

Table 7. AGMC Throughput and Operating Expense
REVENUE - DIRECT MATERIAL == THROUGHPUT
TOTAL COST- DIRECT MATERIAL= OPERATING EXPENSE
95
FY
92
94
93
Revenue($)
92,100,000
82,300,000
72,866,000
78,091,000
Total Cost ($)
85,100,000
77,704,000
78,445,000
74,095,000
Direct Materials ($)
15,919,000
16,350,000
30,115,000
17,710,000
Throughput ($)
76,181,000
65,950,000
42,751,000
60,381,000
Operating Expense ($)
69,181,000
61,354,000
48,330,000
56,385,000

at AGMC has been declining since fiscal year 1992. According to the Handbook for
Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators, throughput is the rate at which an organization
generates money through sales. The trend of decreasing throughput at AGMC indicates
poor throughput performance.
Operating expense is the second performance indicator that is defined by Cox
(1998:56) as the amount of money spent by the organization to convert inventory into
throughput. The objective of this performance indicator is to review the sources of
operating expenses to ensure that it is used for the conversion of inventory into
throughput. In addition, the goal of the indicator when throughput is decreasing is to
decrease at a faster rate (Handbook for Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators,
1997:3-3). The trend in Table 7, pertaining to operating expense, is not decreasing at a
faster rate than the throughput is decreasing.
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NET Operating Results (NOR). The Net Operating Results of AGMC are
comprised of two indicators illustrated in Table 8 (Depot Maintenance Operations
Indicators, 1999). The first indicator is the budgeted costs and revenues followed by the
second indicator of actual costs and revenues. The budgeted NOR index represents how
well the depot management developed the forecasted financial plan. The forecast is based
on internal factors of cost and the market forces of competition and sales. The ability of

Table 8. AGMC Net Operating Results (NOR)

BUDGETED REVENUE/BUDGETED COST = BUDGETED NOR INDEX
ACTUAL REVENUE/ACTUAL COST = ACTUAL NOR INDEX
94
95
FY
92
93
81,754,000 84,525,000
Budgeted Revenue ($)
101,500,000
95,200,000
89,283,000 86,027,000
Budgeted Cost ($)
87,300,000
93,700,000
0.92
0.98
1.16
1.02
Budgeted NOR INDEX
Actual Revenue ($)
Actual Cost ($)
Actual NOR INDEX
NOR INDEX

92,100,000
85,100,000
1.08
0.93

82,300,000
77,704,000
1.06
1.04

72,866,000
78,445,000
0.93
1.01

78,091,000
74,095,000
1.05
1.07

depot management to adhere to the forecasted financial plan is the actual NOR index. An
overall NOR index of greater than 1.00 indicates the actual revenue and cost ratio were
lower than what was budgeted. The goal is to obtain an actual NOR index equal or
greater to the budgeted NOR index (Handbook for Depot Maintenance operations
Indicators, 1997:3-11). The data in Table 8 (Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators,
1999) suggests AGMC accomplished the goal of a NOR ratio of 1.00 or greater.
Total Hourly Cost. The total hourly cost indicator exemplifies the hourly rate
that gets passed on to customers. The desired behavior of this indicator is to reduce the
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cost to the customer, while improving the performance of the products it produces
(Handbook for Depot Maintenance Operation Indicators, 1997:3-13). The data presented
in Table 9 (Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators, 1999) indicate an increasing total
hourly cost of the AGMC from 1992 through 1995. The handbook for Depot
Maintenance Operation Indicators identifies that, if a depot decreases its workload

Table 9. Total Hourly Cost
(TOTAL BUDGETED COST/BUDGETED TOTAL DLH) = BUDGETED TOTAL HOURLY COST
(TOTAL ACTUAL COST/ACTUAL TOTAL DLH) = ACTUAL TOTAL HOURLY COST
FY
92
93
94
95
Total Budgeted Cost ($)
87,300,000
93,700,000
89,283,000 86,027,000
Budgeted Total DLH
1,379,825
1,165,012
1,019,722
832,811
BudgetTotal Hourly Cost
$63.27
$80.43
$87.56
$103.30
Total Actual Cost ($)
Actual Total DLH
Actual Total Hourly Cost
Actual/Bud Hourly Cost

85,100,000
1,285,103
$66.22
1X>5

77,704,000
954,964
$76.76
095

78,445,000 74,095,000
811,675
662,147
$96.65
$111.90
1/10
1.08

without decreasing overhead, the hourly cost will increase as a function of not being able
to spreading indirect and overhead costs. As with the case of AGMC, workload was
approximately cut in half between FY 1992 and 1995 and the total hourly cost increased.
Capital Investment Effectiveness. The Capital Investment Effectiveness (CIE)
indicator of AGMC is illustrated in Table 10 (Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators,
1999). This indicator measures the effectiveness of total throughput versus the long-term
inventory at the depot. The long-term inventory is the total depreciated value of all
capital assets. The desired goal of this indicator is to have a continually increasing CIE
index, which relates to a proper allocation of depot resources (Handbook for Depot
Maintenance Operation Indicators, 1997:3-5).
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The data in Table 10 (Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators, 1999) indicate a
continually decreasing CIE trend at AGMC. As identified by the total hourly cost and the

Table 10. AGMC Capital Investment Effectiveness
THROUGHPUT/LONGTERM INVENTORY = CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS
95
94
93
FY
92
60,381,000
42,751,000
65,950,000
Throughput ($)
76,181,000
610,483,649
583,141,022
604,707,339
Long-term Inventory ($)
654,595,405
0.10
0.07
0.11
INDEX
0.12

schedule indicator data in Table 11, total hours and components repaired were reduced by
50 percent between fiscal years 1992 and 1995, and that has a direct effect on throughput
and the CIE performance indicator.
Schedule Indicator. The schedule indicator measures what quantity of repair
work was accomplished on time. This indicator does not include unplanned workload or
surge requirements but does have provisions to change a customer's workload priorities
to meet operational requirements (Handbook for Depot Maintenance Operation
Indicators, 1997:3-6). Through examining the schedule indicator data in Table 11 (Depot
Maintenance Operations Indicators), a negative trend for accomplishing repair work on
schedule is identified.
Summary of AGMC Performance Metrics. A summary of the performance
metrics at AGMC of fiscal years 1992 through 1995 is illustrated in table 12. It is evident
the performance metrics were declining prior to the privatization of AGMC.
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Table 11. AGMC Schedule Indicator
UNITS COMPLETED ON TIME/UNITS
FY
92
93
Components Scheduled
17,271
12,170
Components Completed
15,972
11,144
INDEX
0.925
0.916

SCHEDULED
94
11,508
10,501
0.912

95
8,790
8,002
0.910

Table 12. Summary of AGMC Performance Metrics

Indicator
Throughput
Operating Expense
Net Operating Results
Total Hourly Cost
Capital investment Effectiveness
Schedule Indicator

Trend FY 92-95
Decreasing
Slowly decreasing
Above break even
Increasing
Decreasing
Decreasing

Effect
Money generation slowing
Expenses not in-line with throughput
Non-optimal planning
Higher per unit cost
Low return on capital assets
Deliveries not on time

Boeing Guidance Repair Center Performance Metric
Performance metrics of the Boeing Guidance and Repair Center are evaluated
under the Aircraft and Missile Award Fee Plans. The privatization of the AGMC depot
operations to the private contractor, Boeing, has changed considerable the performance
metrics of the repair operations. The performance metrics that were reported according
to the Handbook for Depot Maintenance Operations Indicators do not apply to privately
contracted depot repairs. Instead, an award fee plan for the aircraft and missile
workloads were included as part of the contract to Boeing.
Missile Award Fee Plan. The award fee plan for repair of the missile workload
includes four areas of evaluation: quality and repair performance, cost performance, risk
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identification and mitigation, and ICBM team relationships (Award Fee Plan for the
ICBM Guidance Repair Program, 1999:8).
Quality and Repair Performance. The quality and repair performance
metrics area consists of four metrics: serviceable spares available, total number of zero
and short time rejections, total number of repeat rejections, and probability of survival.
Separate metrics are maintained for the Minuteman and Peacekeeper systems.
The serviceable spares metric is the monthly average of the total number of
serviceable at all missile wings. To achieve an excellent rating the indicator for the
serviceable spares metric requires that enough guidance sets are available so the
serviceable spares metric is always at least 12 percent above the average monthly
rejection rate of the previous period (Award Fee Plan for the ICBM Guidance Repair
Program, 1999:11).
Figure 1(ICBM Guidance System Repair Award Fee Briefing, 1999:10) illustrates
Minuteman NS-20 serviceable spares. The data in Figure 1 identifies the serviceable
spares level has been excellent since July 1997. The total number of zero and short time
rejects is defined as assets rejected with zero to 720 operational hours. The total number
of zero and short time rejection should be 28 or less per month to achieve an excellent
rating (Award Fee Plan for the ICBM Guidance Repair Program, 1999:11).
Figure 2 (ICBM Guidance System Repair Award Fee Briefing, 1999:8) illustrates
the Minuteman NS-20 zero and short time rejects. The data in Figure 2 presents that since
April of 1997 no single month incurred more then 10 rejects, which is significantly lower
then the required maximum of 28. From September 1997 the six-month average has been
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Figure 1. Minuteman NS-20 Serviceable Spares
well under the 28 required for an excellent rating (ICBM Guidance System Repair Award
Fee Briefing, 1999).
The repeat rejection performance measure is defined as a rejection with similar
rejection systems with less than 2000 hours on a specific system. To achieve an excellent
rating the total number of repeat rejections must be 12 or less (Award Fee Plan for the
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Figure 2. Minuteman NS-20 Zero and Short Time Rejections
ICBM Guidance Repair Program, 1999:11). Figure 3 (ICBM Guidance System Repair
Award Fee Briefing, 1999:9) illustrates the Minuteman NS-20 repeat rejections. The data
in Figure 3 presents the monthly repeat rejections have been significantly under the
required 12 to achieve an excellent rating.
The Minuteman guidance system probability of error indicates how long a unit is
expected to operate. A 12-month historical baseline is used to make a comparison of data
(Award Fee Plan for the ICBM Guidance Repair Program, 1999:11).
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Figure 3. Minuteman NS-20 Repeat Rejections
Figure 4 (ICBM Guidance System Repair Award Fee Briefing, 1999:11)
illustrates the current Minuteman missile guidance system probability of survival
performance measure.
The Peacekeeper quality and repair performance metrics consists of Peacekeeper
NS-30 serviceable spares and repaired rejections. To receive an excellent rating enough
guidance sets spares must be available to keep the vault holding area filled (Award Fee
Plan for the ICBM Guidance Repair Program, 1999:12). According to the missile award
fee plan the number of spare guidance sets has been set at seven.
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Figure 5 (ICBM Guidance System Repair Award Fee Briefing, 1999:12)
illustrates the monthly status of the Peacekeeper guidance set spares. As the data
presents, there have been ample guidance sets available as spares for the last two years.
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Figure 4. Minuteman Missile Guidance System Probability of Survival
The second performance metric is the Peacekeeper NS-30 repaired rejections. To
receive an excellent rating the average number of repaired rejections must be less then
seven percent of the monthly repaired guidance sets (Award Fee Plan for the ICBM
Guidance Repair Program, 1999:12). Figure 6 (ICBM Guidance System Repair Award
Fee Briefing, 1999:13) illustrates the number of Peacekeeper NS-30 monthly repaired
rejects covering a two-year period from April 1997 through March 1999.
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As the data in Figure 6 presents, between November 1998 and January 1999 the
repaired rejections went above the excellent rating. Consequently, over the 18 months
prior to November 1998, only in April 1997 was the repaired rejection rate above seven
percent. The repair rejections remained, for the most part, in the excellent rating area.
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Missile Cost Performance. The cost performance metrics for the missile
guidance repair program consists of meeting the government cost objectives for the
program as outlined in the repair contract. To achieve an excellent rating in cost, the
contractor must strive to improve cost performance without any sacrifice to quality. In
addition, the contractor must identify potential cost performance and funding issues and
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Figure 6. Peacekeeper NS-30 Repaired Rejections
pursue solutions to problems that may impact the overall program costs. The contractor
must also submit all cost reports on time with a full analysis explaining cost variances
(Award Fee Plan for the ICBM Guidance Repair Program, 1999:13). According to the
ICBM Guidance System Repair Award Fee Briefing, Boeing has been under the contract
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budgeted costs by 4.4 percent. Additionally, Y2K requirements were completed on
schedule and within budgeted costs. Overall cost performance has been rated as excellent
for the BGRC over the past award period (ICBM Guidance System Repair Award Fee
Briefing, 1999:4).
Risk Identification and Mitigation. To achieve an excellent rating in the
risk identification and mitigation area several tasks must be accomplished. First, Boeing
must proactively and formally identify areas of technical or management risks and
develop plans to resolve the risks. Boeing must also anticipate potential problems and
take action to minimize the impact. Finally, Boeing must actively work with the
Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) community to minimize the GRP risks and
enhance the performance of the total GRP (Award Fee Plan for the ICBM Guidance
Repair Program, 1999:14). The May 1999 ICBM Guidance System Repair Award Fee
Briefing (1999:5) identified that Boeing is actively working with the GRP community
and received and excellent rating.
ICBM Team Relationship. The Award Fee Plan for the ICBM Guidance
Repair Program (1999:14) identifies Boeing must demonstrate exceptional team working
relationships at the repair facility to receive an excellent rating. Additionally, team
member conflicts and program conflicts must be identified and resolved without
government assistance. Finally, all contractual relationships with team members (vendors
or third party providers) must not interfere with program support requirements.
According to the May 1999 ICBM Guidance System Repair Award Fee Briefing (1999:
6) the BGRC team performed excellent with personnel from the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) along with the Y2K and new Minuteman guidance part vendors.

59

Aircraft Award Fee Plan. The award fee plan for the repair of the aircraft
workload includes three areas of evaluation: repair performance, cost performance, and
program management (Award Fee Plan for Aircraft Guidance and Navigation Repair
Program, 1997:9).
Aircraft Repair Performance. The repair performance area on the
aircraft award fee plan includes three sub-categories to include schedule performance,
field performance, and procedures, skills and parts support.
The schedule performance measure requires the contractor to maintain an
effective repair program. To accomplish this and receive an excellent rating, Boeing
must meet 95 percent of the required delivery schedule for repaired items (Award Fee
Plan for the Aircraft Guidance and Navigation Repair Program, 1997:11).
BGRC has received an excellent rating in schedule performance except for one
six month period. Since the start of the contract 100 percent of the contract delivery
requirements have been met with the exception of April 1997 through September 1997
where only 89 percent of deliveries were on time (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:26).
Additionally, it was identified that very little to no government intervention was required
for BGRC to meet production requirements (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:4).
The field performance measure demonstrates the reliability, maintainability, and
accuracy of the repaired systems and equipment in the operational environment. To
achieve an excellent rating, Boeing's aircraft repair program must be proactive and
efficient. To accomplish this, the overall field performance must demonstrate
improvement in quality deficiency reports (QDR), reliability, and mission capable
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(MICAP) rates (Award Fee Plan for the Aircraft Guidance and Navigation Repair
Program, 1997:11-12).
BGRC has received an excellent rating in field performance of repaired items
since the start of the contract (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:26). Additionally, the
performance of repaired items in the field has continued to improved with zero
workmanship QDRs in 3047 total repaired items (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:6).
The procedures, skills, and parts support performance measure demonstrates the
ability of Boeing to maintain a parts system that supports contract delivery requirements.
To receive an excellent rating, Boeing must ensure that no production is impacted due to
non-availability of contractor furnished materials (CFM). Additionally, Boeing must
track all CFM and be proactive in achieving best values for the government considering
order and inventory costs. Finally, Boeing must'maintain a formally documented training
program and insure the experience level of hired employees is adequate to perform
assigned tasks (Award Fee Plan for the Aircraft Guidance and Navigation Repair
Program, 1997:11-12).
BGRC has received an excellent rating in procedure, skills and parts support since
the start of the contract except for October 1996 through March 1997 where they received
a very good rating (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:26). It has been identified that BGRC
continues to resolve depot support equipment supportability problems in a timely manner.
Additionally, the increased use of commercial parts to improve long range supportability
has reduced costs. Finally, BGRC has been able to keep employee attrition rates below 5
percent (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:7).
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Aircraft Cost Performance. The cost performance measure indicates
how Boeing manages the costs that lead to lowering total support cost to the government.
The measure also identifies how Boeing adequately justifies costs that are in excess of the
contract targeted costs. To receive an excellent rating Boeing's accumulated costs must
be more than five percent under the estimated contract costs. Boeing must also take the
initiative to identify potential cost, scheduling, and funding issues to prevent contract cost
growth. Finally, Boeing must provide a full analysis of all cost reports to included a
rational and thorough explanation of cost variance (Award Fee Plan for the Aircraft
Guidance and Navigation Repair Program, 1997:13).
BGRC cost performance has been excellent except for the period of October 1997
through March 1998 were they received a very good rating. (Aircraft Award Brief,
1999:26). It has been identified that BGRC has made significant improvements and
enhancements to cost analysis and control by an initiative to correlate cost with specific
cost drivers. Additionally, costs for last period ran 5 percent under cost target. (Aircraft
Award Brief, 1999:12). This resulted in better management capabilities to control cost
growth.
Program Management. The program management performance measure
consists of five sub categories: management systems, contract change management,
subcontracting management, risk identification and mitigation, and management
integration.
The management systems performance measure indicates how well Boeing
successfully uses all management data programs and systems in producing the required
management reports. To achieve an excellent rating, a quality program with an active
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audit and surveillance program must be maintained to ensure products conform to
technical requirements. In addition, inventory records must be accurate, and the property
control system must meet all contractual requirements. Data submitted by Boeing must
be timely and accurate on the first submittal (Award Fee Plan for the Aircraft Guidance
and Navigation Repair Program, 1997:14).
BGRC started low in this performance measure but has recently been rated
excellent over the last year. During the first period of the contract October 1996 through
March 1997 this performance measure was rated as unsatisfactory (Aircraft Award Brief,
1999:26). However, noteworthy is BGRC recent effort in that government property
control systems are compliant in all areas resulting in a 98 percent accurate inventory
(Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:16).
The contract change management performance metric indicates how well Boeing
performs changes to the repair contract. To achieve an excellent rating, Boeing must be
proactive and meet contract change requirements to include high quality, complete, and
accurate proposals that meet negotiated deadlines (Award Fee Plan for the Aircraft
Guidance and Navigation Repair Program, 1997:15).
BGRC has received an excellent rating in contract change management since the
start of the contract (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:26). It has been recognized that
communication between BGRC and Oklahoma City ALC has been exceptional and
contract modifications were accomplished in a timely manner (Aircraft Award Brief,
1999:20).
The subcontracting management performance metric insures timely and accurate
subcontracting cost and schedule visibility. To achieve an excellent rating problems must
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be identified early and resolved quickly with no impact to the production schedule
(Award Fee Plan for the Aircraft Guidance and Navigation Repair Program, 1997:15).
BGRC has received an excellent rating in the subcontracting management
performance area since the start of the contract (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:26). The
proactive approach BGRC has taken with subcontracts has resulted in an improvement in
cost visibility through more timely invoices (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:21).
The risk identification and mitigation performance metric measures how well
Boeing formally identifies areas of management or technical risk. To achieve an
excellent rating a plan must be developed to mitigate risk as well as resolving identified
in accordance with the work specification and transition plan (Award Fee Plan for the
Aircraft Guidance and Navigation Repair Program, 1997:16).
BGRC has rated between satisfactory and very good in risk identification and
mitigation for the first 18 months of the contract with excellent ratings for the past year
(Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:26).
The management integration performance metric measures the integration of
programs, systems, and functions that effects the entire repair system. To achieve an
excellent rating Boeing must take advantage of existing information from program
offices, associate contractors, and Defense Logistics Agency to accomplish the repair of
the guidance and navigation systems. In addition, Boeing must be proactive in
identifying and resolving common issues with other contractors and the government.
Open lines of communication must exist between all contractor functional areas, Defense
Contract Management Command, and the Air Force (Award Fee Plan for the Aircraft
Guidance and Navigation Repair Program, 1997:16).
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BGRC has received very good ratings in management integration over the first 18
months of the contract and received and excellent ratings for the past year (Aircraft
Award Brief, 1999:26). It has been acknowledged as the repair process continues to
improve, this reflects positive management integration (Aircraft Award Brief, 1999:23).
Summary of BGRC Performance Metrics. A summary of the BGRC aircraft
performance metrics is contained in Table 13. The repair and cost performance measures
have maintained either a very good or excellent rating since the beginning of the repair
contract. The program management performance measures show a steady increase in
performance since the beginning of the repair contract. The trend of the BGRC
performance metrics is that all performance areas have risen to achieve an excellent
rating over the past year of operations.

Table 13. Summary of BGRC Aircraft Performance Metrics
Performance Measure

Oct-96 Mar-97

April-97 Sep-97

Oct-97Mar-98

April-98- Oct-98Sep-98 Mar-99

Repair Performance
Schedule Performance
Excellent
Field Performance
Excellent
Procedures Skills & Parts Very Good

Very Good
Excellent
Excellent

Excellent
Excellent
Excellent

Excellent Excellent
Excellent Excellent
Excellent Excellent

Cost Performance

Excellent

Excellent

Very Good Excellent Excellent

Program Management
PM/Systems
Contract Change Mgt
Subcontract Mgt
Risk ID and Mgt
Mgt Integration

Unsatisfactory
Excellent
Excellent
Satisfactory
Very Good

Satisfactory
Excellent
Excellent
Very Good
Very Good

Very Good
Excellent
Excellent
Very Good
Very Good
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Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent

Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent

Depot Maintenance Policy Changes
Investigative question four asked how did depot maintenance policy or procedures
change since the privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center?
Policies and procedures governing the operations of the DoD depot system have
changed moderately since the privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology
Center. The most important changes have been directed by the FY98/99 National
Defense Authorization Acts, FY98/99 Appropriations Acts, The 1998 DoD Logistics
Strategic Plan, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology Policy
Memorandums, and the DoD Directive 5000.2.
Depot-Level Maintenance and Repair Definition. The National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 98 provided a revised definition of what is to be considered as
depot-level maintenance and repair. In general, "depot-level maintenance and repair" is
defined as material maintenance or repair requiring the overhaul, upgrading, or rebuilding
of parts, assemblies, or subassemblies, and the testing and reclamation of equipment as
necessary. The important definition change in the 1998 National Defense Authorization
Act concerns the inclusion of interim contractor support (ICS) or contractor logistics
support (CLS) in support of depot maintenance (Defense Depot Maintenance Council
Business Plan, 1998:7).
Changing the definition of what is considered depot-level maintenance and repair
may appear miniscule, but digging deeper into this definition can lead to a better
understanding. The inclusion of the interim contractor support and contractor logistics
support was a strategic move by the Depot Caucus. Most of this work is already
accomplished by private contractors and would push the Defense Services closer to the
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50 percent maximum contractor ceiling. This will prevent the movement of additional
workload from the organic military depots to the private contract sector (Gorman, 1999).
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 99 again "clarified" the definition
of depot-level maintenance and repair. The definition now includes a provision pertaining
to location. The location, whether at a public or private depot repair facility, at which the
maintenance or repair is performed is not a limitation to competing depot workload
(Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, 1998:5).
The trend of depot maintenance repair operations not performed at a defense
depot required the legislation to be modified to include facilities that are not primarily
organic depot maintenance activities (Gorman, 1999). This ensured that workloads
performed by a private contractor, at their facility, was counted as depot maintenance per
the 50/50 rule.
Core Logistics Capabilities. Core logistic capabilities have been an area for
debate since the outsourcing and privatization initiatives started. How much of the repair
depot operations should remain organic to the DoD? Section 356 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 98 addressed core logistics capabilities. This section requires
that the Secretary of Defense to identify core logistics capabilities and workloads to
maintain organically these capabilities. Core logistics capabilities include the capabilities
which are necessary to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and
resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response to a mobilization, national
defense contingency situations, and other emergency requirements.
Most significant in this section is that performance of workloads to maintain core
logistics capabilities must be performed organically, not in the private sector. DoD is
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required to maintain core logistics capabilities at government-owned and governmentoperated (GOGOs) facilities. The GOGOs are required to ensure cost efficiency and
technical competence in peacetime, while preserving the surge capacity and
reconstitution capabilities. Section 356 also extends the limitation on contracting, stating
that performance of workload to support core logistics capabilities may not be contracted
for performance by non-government personnel. (Defense Depot Maintenance Council
Business Plan, 1998:8).
This section in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 98 basically retains
organic depot facilities, thus keeping thousands of jobs in several states secure. The
capabilities provision on four years after achieving initial operational capabilities was
included because of the C-17 flexible sustainment contract. The C-17 flexible contract
gave the depot maintenance to the original equipment manufacturer, Boeing, for the life
of the system (Gorman, 1999).
60/40 to 50/50 Rule. Section 357 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY98 increased the percentage of depot-level maintenance and repair that may be
contracted for performance by non-government personnel from 40 percent to 50 percent.
Thus, beginning with FY 98, not more than 50 percent of the funds made available to a
armed service or defense agency for depot-level maintenance may be used to contract for
performance of depot maintenance by non-government personnel (Defense Depot
Maintenance Council Business Plan, 1998:8).
The "50/50 rule" on the surface seems to make available an additional 10 percent
of non-core repair to be competed to private contractors. However, going back to the
definition of what is considered depot maintenance repair is important. Because interim
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contractor support and contractor logistic support where already accomplished by a
private contractor, and now counted as depot maintenance, the 50/50 ruling is somewhat
negated.
Competitive Procedures. Section 359 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for FY98 amends Title 10, USC, by inserting a new section, Section 2469a, "Use Of
Competitive Procedures in Contracting for Performance of Depot-Level Maintenance and
Repair Workloads Formerly Performed At Certain Military Installations." In essence, this
section presents the competitive procedures that must be adhered to for workload shifts
required as a result of the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment process.
The law applies to any depot-level maintenance and repair workload performed as
of 1 January 1997, and is proposed to be converted from performance by DoD personnel
to performance by a private sector source.
This section also imposes conditions for solicitation of bids, most importantly it
requires the consideration of both public and private bids. It requires that source selection
must include fair market value of any provided land, plant or equipment from a military
installation to a private offerer; and total direct and indirect costs and savings. Further,
this law requires equal treatment of depreciation, allows for performance at any location,
as well as teaming by both public and private entities, and forbids preference to offerers
for performance of workloads in-place or any other single location (Defense Depot
Maintenance Council Business Plan, 1998:9).
This legislation came to surface from the closure of Sacramento and San Antonio
ALCs. The original plan in the President's BRAC 95 directive was to privatize both
depots in place. It was the intent to privatize the workload in place through private-
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private competition. However, after being reminded the "$3 million law" requires publicprivate competition in depot maintenance repair, the depot workload was competitively
competed. At one point in the San Antonio ALC closure process, Oklahoma City ALC
was told it could not team with a private contractor to compete for the depot repair
workload (Gorman, 1999). The competitive competition legislation as stated allows for
teaming and enabled Oklahoma City ALC to team with Boeing for an aircraft workload
package.
A key competition policy document is the 2 May 1997 memorandum from the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. The policy states that
organic DoD maintenance depots are eligible to participate in public-private competitions
for depot-level workloads not necessary to sustain core capabilities. Market analysis is
required for competitions, and the provisions of Title 10 sections 2466 (50/50) and 2469
($3M) apply. The competition policy requires an "arms length" relationship with
competing depots and that the government communicates equally with all offerers. The
competition must ensure that maximum cost comparability of proposals is included and
that public depots must have well documented accounting procedures for direct and
indirect costs. These procedures must be auditable by the Defense Contract Audit
Administration (Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, 1998:11).
This policy memorandum was driven by the experiences at Sacramento and San
Antonio ALCs during the initial privatization-in-place process. Once it was determined
that the privatization-in-place was not going to happen, these procedures were drafted.
These procedures addressed some of the past criticisms of public-private competitions
(Gorman, 1999).
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Personnel End Strength. Section 360 of the National Defense Appropriations
Act for FY 98 amends Section 2472(a) of USC Title 10. It now states that civilian
employees of the DoD, including the civilian employees of the military departments and
the defense agencies may not be managed on end strength numbers. Any civilian
employee involved in the performance of depot-level maintenance and repair workloads
may not be managed on the basis of any constraint or limitation in terms of man years,
end strength, full-time equivalent positions, or maximum number of employees (Defense
Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, 1998:9).
The notion is that depots are to be staffed as workload volume dictates. However,
over the past ten years, various personnel ceilings have been levied within DoD and the
services. The purpose of this legislation is to prevent such a ceiling as being cited as the
reason for not increasing employment at a depot to handle anticipated workload. The net
effect is that if a depot does hire more people, some organization within the service must
loss people in order for that service to comply with whatever ceiling has been levied upon
it (Gorman, 1999).
Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence. Section 361 of National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 98 amends Chapter 146 of USC Title 10 by adding a
new section (2474), Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence (CITE). The
Secretary of Defense is required to designate each depot-level activity of the military
departments and the defense agencies as a CITE in the recognized core competencies of
the activity.
Under this new section, each military department and defense agency must
reengineer industrial processes and adopt best-business practices at their depot-level
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activities in connection with their core competency requirements. Each CITE will serve
as recognized leaders in their core competencies throughout the DoD and in the national
technology and industrial base. Additionally, each CITEs can enter into public-private
cooperative arrangements for the performance of depot-level maintenance and repair at
the CITEs. Finally, section 2474 includes measures to enable a private sector entity that
enters into a partnership arrangement or leases excess equipment and facilities at a CITE,
to perform additional work at the CITE outside of the types of work normally assigned to
the CITE (Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, 1998:10).
The driving force behind naming the organic depot facilities as CITEs is to
solidify the existence of organic depots in the face of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisitions and Technology who wants to eliminate organic depots. However, to date
no CITEs have been designated because the Services and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisitions and Technology can not agree on what capabilities constitute core, and
the depots are to be designated as CITEs in their "recognized core competencies"
(Gorman, 1999).
Commercial Items. Section 343 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY 99 pertains to the determination of military items being commercial items for
purposes of the exception to requirements regarding core logistics capabilities. The
mandate to maintain core logistics capabilities has an exemption for commercial items.
Section 343 amends Section 2464 of Title 10 USC by adding a new subsection to
establish justification requirements for military equipment or weapon systems determined
to be commercial items for the purposes of the exception. Section 343 states that when
applying the commercial item exception, a commercial item is to be established by the

72

Secretary of Defense submitting to Congress a notification of the determination and the
justification of the determination. (Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan,
1998:5). The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology has argued
that if an item is Commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS), the rationale for having a core
capacity for that item is contradictory (Gorman, 1999). Since there is sufficient
commercial repair capability in the private sector, organic capabilities are excessive.
Prime Vendor Contracts. Section 346 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 99 sets conditions for expanding the use of prime vendor contracts for depotlevel maintenance and repair of weapon systems and military equipment. This section
states that prime vendor contracts may not be entered until Congress receives a report
describing the competitive procedures used to award the prime vendor contract. The
report must contain an analysis of costs and benefits that demonstrates that use of the
prime vendor contract will result in savings to the government over the life of the
contract.
Under this section, a "prime vendor contract" means an innovative contract that
gives a defense contractor the responsibility to manage, store, and distribute inventory,
manage and provide services, or manage and perform research, on behalf of the DoD on a
frequent, regular basis (Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, 1998:6).
The specific impetus for this legislation is the Army's proposed "Team Apache"
contract that will give lifetime support for the Apache helicopter to a consortium of three
contractors on a sole-source basis. This legislation also maintains a baseline of vendors
able to submit for contracts for workloads. This also limits the use of contractor logistics
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support and prevents the government from being "sold short" on sole source lifetime
contracts (Gorman, 1999).
Reserve Components. Section 8106 of the Defense Appropriation Act for
FY 99 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an analysis to the congressional
defense committees on Reserve Components depot activities. An in-depth analysis
comparing the cost of any proposed establishment or expansion of depot facilities by
the Reserve Components to the cost of performing the same work at existing depot
facilities or by the private sector (Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan,
1998:7).
With the concentration of eliminating non-core activities from defense depots and
maximizing in-place capacity, it is expected that the Reserve Components fall in line with
current depot policy initiatives.
1998 DoD Logistic Strategic Plan. The 1998 DoD Logistic Strategic Plan, 7
January 1998, delineates several depot maintenance-specific policies that emphasize
making optimum use of the total industrial base supporting depot-level maintenance.
The plan calls for the total maintenance infrastructure to be restructured over
time. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy is to pursue opportunities for
eliminating public sector maintenance infrastructure through increased competitive
sourcing, greater consolidation, and aggressive re-engineering of activities across all
levels of maintenance. The plan also calls for the discontinuance of transfers of
workloads from the private sector to the public sector except where required for reasons
of national security.
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The DoD will pursue efficient use of public sector maintenance depots through
improved capacity utilization. To achieve this, public sector (organic) capacities will be
downsized with increased private sector material support, reduced cycle times and
reduced inventory storage points. The 1998 DoD Logistic Strategic Plan states that the
DoD will pursue public-private competitions for depot-level maintenance and repair
workloads accomplished by federal government personnel to the maximum extent
allowed by statute. The policy is for the services to use competition to achieve the most
effective use of both public and private sectors for the accomplishment of workloads, but
will do so within the statutory levels established by Section 2466 of Title 10 concerning
the 50/50 rule (Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, 1998:11-12).
This policy essentially is the "starting point" for the end of the defense depot
system, as it has been known for the past several decades. The next step will be for the
50/50 rule to be changed to the 40/60 rule, in favor of the private sector.
Total Logistics Support of New Weapon Systems. The DoD 5000.2-R,
Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major Automated
Information Systems, states that it is DoD policy to retain capabilities to provide effective
and timely response to surge demands, ensure competitive capabilities, and sustain
institutional expertise. Support concepts for new and modified systems shall maximize
the use of contractor-provided, long-term, total life-cycle logistics support that combines
depot-level maintenance for non-core related workload. Best value over the life-cycle of
the weapon system and use of existing contractor capabilities, particularly while the
system is in production, shall be key determinants in the overall decision process.
(Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, 1998:12).
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DoD guidance again has aimed at eliminating the organic depot maintenance
capacities. The emphasis on using a private contractor for new weapons systems will
eventually leave the public depots with little workload with the phase-out of older
weapon systems. Table 14 summarizes the major changes in depot policy.

Table 14. Summary of Depot Policy Changes
Depot Policy Change
Depot level Maintenance and Repair Definition

Effect
Inclusion of interim contractor support (ICS)
or contractor logistics support (CLS)

Core Logistics Capabilities

Services have to define their core capabilites

60/40 to 50/50 Rule

Increase in amount of funds that can go to
private sector depot repairs

Competitive Procedures

Competition of workloads must be
competitive and certified

Personnel End Strength

Civilain depot personnel not managed on end strength

Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence

Core capabilities identified with a single depot facility

Commercial Items

Commercial items not considered a core capability

Prime Vendor Contracts

Prevents one contractor from dominating a workload

Reserve Components

Stops the Reserves from building own depot system

1998 DoD Logistic Strategic Plan

Elimination of public sector depots over time

Total Logistics Support of New Weapon Systems Focuses on private contracorts
to support new weapon systems
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this study was to examine several aspects associated with the
privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark AFB and
examine how depot policy changes have occurred since the privatization . Specifically,
the initial justification that concluded privatizing the workload would reduce excess
depot capacity along with cost savings was researched. Additionally, a comparison of
performance metrics of organic versus private operation of the depot was examined to
investigate the performance of each sector. Finally, defense depot maintenance policy
changes that will have an impact on depot operations of the future were examined.
Each investigative question will be restated followed by conclusions drawn from
the data and recommendations for future action.

Investigative Question One.
How did the privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at
Newark AFB reduce the excess depot capacity within the Air Force?
Conclusion. At the time of the decision to close Newark AFB and privatize the
depot operations, it was determined the Air Force had 8.9 million hours of excess depot
capacity. However, the data supplied from several sources indicate the maintenance
repair depot at Newark did not incur the claimed 1.7 million hours of excess depot
capacity. In fact, examining the workload and capacity data between 1986 and 1991
AGMC had a capacity utilization of 119 percent - working over capacity, not excess. In
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comparison, the Sacramento ALC depot during the same period had a capacity utilization
of 8 7 percent.
In examining the data the author noticed that in FY 91 the actual workload
amounted to approximately 1.7 million hours. It is this author's suggestion that this
figure was taken from the workload and capacity data, from an inexperienced staff
worker, and mistakenly labeled as excess depot capacity. This figure then was exploited
in the BRAC political process of closing an Air Force depot. This suggestion is
highlighted in the words of Colonel Joseph Renaud, Commander of AGMC in 1993, "I
think the command offered up Newark AFB as the token something" (Fisher, 1996).
Recommendation. It appears the justification to close Newark AFB and
privatize the depot repair workload was not correct. However, keeping the Newark depot
off the BRAC 95 list would have been virtually impossible due to both San Antonio and
Sacramento ALC's recommend for closure. The recommendation to close such a huge
complex that effects thousands of lives needs to be carefully analyzed and verified before
proceeding to closure. Misunderstood definitions and misusing information can lead to
making possibly the wrong decision that can include undesirable results. It is this
author's recommendation that in any project as complex as privatizing or closing an Air
Force depot, the assumptions and justifications need to be certified by multiple sources.

Investigative Question Two
Is the contractor operated Boeing Guidance Repair Center more costly than when
the government operated the repair depot?

78

Conclusion. Cost studies completed by Ogden, Oklahoma City, and Warner
Robins ALCs all indicate the costs associated with private contract operations are most
likely $16.7 million more per year. It is important to understand that many costs not
associated with organic operations are required to be included with a private contractor
operation. These costs included contract oversight and administration, contract award
fee, and lease costs.
The evolution of determining what costs are associated with privatizing a depot
operation have been highlighted by the AGMC privatization. The cost comparability
handbook that is used to compare public versus private sector costs had been changed
several times and completely revised in January 1998. This ensures a precise comparison
when depot workload is competed against the public and private sector.
It is important to note the cost studies included in this thesis indicate it costs
millions more to operate the repair facility under Boeing, but Boeing continues to receive
high marks in for their cost program (see pages 58,62 and Table 13). How can this be?
The reasoning behind this is, at the time the contract was awarded to Boeing it was
determined a good estimate on what the costs were. The contract to Boeing was award
based on these cost figures and they measure themselves against this figure. As the
evolution of the privatization of depot workload continued, it was identified that
additional costs such as award fees, contract oversight, and lease agreements must be
included in the "total cost".
The "lost" 1995 cost analysis conducted by AFMC that concluded privatization
would save $5 million a year is key to this privatization. Without this document, the
assumptions and factors used in the determination that privatization will never be known.
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Not only did it cost approximately $16.7 million more to operate the depot in FY 97; the
privatization transition costs and Newark closure costs have approached $70 million
dollars, so far. All of this was accomplished in the name of saving taxpayers money by
reducing excess depot capacity. However, the cost analysis indicate the privatization has
been at the expense of the taxpayer. The statement by the AFMC/CC General Yates,
"This is not about saving money, it is about closing a base," reflects the intense pressure
to close Newark AFB, no matter the cost.
Recommendation. Certification procedures applicable to competing depot level
workloads were incorporated by changes in the BRAC 95 legislative statutes. It is
reasonable to recommend that all pre-1995 BRAC decisions be analyzed to determine if
reduced costs have materialized. If costs have increased, action on these activities needs to
be accomplished.

Investigative Question Three
How did the performance metrics of the depot maintenance repairs change under
contractor operations? Are the performance metrics better when the government
operated the repair depot or are the performance metrics better under a private
contractor?
Conclusion. The data concerning the performance metrics at AGMC before
privatization suggests a trend toward declining performance. Several factors could
explain why this trend occurred. First, as the data established, the workload at AGMC
was declining which can be contributed to the workload of the Minuteman II missile was
phased out of service. Second, after Newark was spared from the 1991 BRAC process
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the "stamp" of BRAC was placed on AGMC and was no longer a priority in the depot
arena. Finally, after Newark was recommended for closure the emphasis shifted from
operating a depot to closing an Air Force Base and transitioning the repair depot to a
private contract.
The BGRC metrics have continually improved since the start of the contract to the
point all areas were rated excellent over the past year of operations. The underlying
question is how does the performance of the two operations compare? A quick look at
the data would clearly indicate that BGRC operations are performing much better then
when the repair workload was accomplished by AGMC. However, this may not be the
case for the performance metrics for each repair operation has different basic factors and
assumptions. A true "Apples to Apples" comparison of the performance metrics cannot
be made concerning AGMC and BGRC. The performance metrics for AGMC are based
on the Handbook for Depot Maintenance Operation Indicators criteria that was developed
for fixed price operations that could be applied universally to all DoD depots. Contrary,
BGRC is a cost plus award fee contract with specially tailored performance metric plan
for their specific operations. Jerry Pratt (1999), the Program Integrator at DCMCNewark stated, "To make any kind of comparison, even a remote comparison, you would
have to make many, many, many assumptions about the environment that AGMC
operated in versus the current BGRC contractual environment." This statement from one
of the foremost knowledgeable people concerning the depot repair operations at
AGMC/BGRC highlights the inability to make a true comparison.
Recommendation. As the data revealed, BGRC has received an excellent rating
in all performance areas for the past year and has little room to improve. The current
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contract is a cost plus award fee type which places most of the cost burden on the
government. Now that the private contractor has operated the depot for several years and
has avoided most the potential cost risks associated with the initial transition, it is time
for the a fixed price type of contract is negotiated with Boeing.

Investigative Question Four
How did depot maintenance policy or procedures change since the privatization of
the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center?

Conclusion. The results in chapter four clearly indicate numerous changes have
been made in depot policy since the AGMC privatization. The overarching theme in the
changes can be traced to two schools of thought. First, the politicians whose political
boundaries include the three remaining organic depots want to secure the status, of
organic depots, into the distance future. This would benefit the politicians and their
constituents by keeping high paying government jobs in their districts. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense maintains the second school of thought. Guidance stemming from
this office wants to let the private sector market economy support more non-core and
eventually all the defense depot maintenance workloads. This would enable the DoD to
focus more on the remaining warfighting capabilities throughout the military.
An example of how the two sides translated their desires into a depot policy
change. The previous 60/40 rule mandated that only 40 percent of funds could be spent
on private sector depot maintenance. The OSD implemented changes to this that allowed
a 50/50 funding between organic and the private sector. The depot caucus, politicians
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with deep depot interests, countered this policy change with a redefinition on what repair
workloads were considered depot repair workloads. The depot caucus championed a
legislative act that changed the definition to included interim contractor support (ICS)
and contractor logistics support (CLS). The significance of this is that private contractors
already accomplished the ICS and CLS workloads, so the new 50/50 rule was somewhat
nullified by this change.
Recommendation. Defense depot policy will continue to evolve in
corresponding with what emphasis the OSD or depot caucus deems beneficial to their
desires. In examining whether the workload should be accomplished by the public
(organic) or private sector, a "total systems" approach should be used. With the total
system encompassing the United States, it shouldn't matter in what state or who
accomplishes the workload. It should matter that the workload is accomplished by the
sector that does the best job utilizing the minimum resources.

Chapter Summary
The four investigative questions have been researched and have concluded the
following: the initial recommendation to close Newark AFB was flawed, it has cost
approximately $70 million more to operate the depot under a private contractor, a true
comparison of performance metrics between AGMC and BGRC cannot be made due to
the differences in basic operating principles, and that depot maintenance policy is shifting
toward eliminating public (organic) repair depots.
The future of BGRC will have to contend with the loss of the Peacekeeper ICBM
from service, the Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) for the Minuteman III, and the
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continual increases in the reliability of new aircraft guidance systems. All of these
factors will place extreme pressures on the depot repair operations and only time will tell
what the outcome will be at the Boeing Guidance Repair Center.

Recommendations for Future Research
The privatization-in-place of the AGMC repair depot was the first of its kind.
Currently, there are no other DoD repair depots undergoing a privatization-in-place (PIP)
process to determine if a "second generation" PIP would be more successful in dollar
costs than AGMC. However, numerous other support activities throughout the DoD have
been privatized and researching if the anticipated costs have actually materialized would
help determine future privatization efforts.
The repair depots at Sacramento and San Antonio ALCs have just recently
finished competing their depot workloads to the remaining DoD depots and several
private sector contractors. Research into how the depot transition process was
accomplished at Sacramento and San Antonio could help future DoD depot downsizing.
Now, several years after the first round of outsourcing and privatization projects
have been completed, researching the effects of outsourcing and privatization on active
duty units could help in future decisions to reduce infrastructure.
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Appendix A: Ogden ALC Missile Repair Costs
Missiles Repair
Repair
Lease
Award Fee
Materials
Overhead Costs
General and Administrative
Unprogrammed Work
SubTotal:
Cost Adjustments:
AGMC
BOS Adjustment
Gov't Organic PMS
Unfunded Civilian Retirement Benefits
State Unemployment Payments
Casualty Insurance
Impact Aid
Retiree Health Benefits
Depreciation for MCP Facilities
DFAS Support
Dispensary
Information Services
SubTotal:
BGRC
Equipment Depreciation
Travel
Capital Improvements
DMBA Contract Administration Fee
Privatization (PKT/DCAA/DCMC)
Security and Medical
SubTotal:
Missile Total:
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AGMC
BGRC
$5,860,435 $20,051,918
$3,114,664
$2,145,652
$9,036,769
$9,036,769
$5,135,759
$725,346
$3,362,156
$1,673,613
$1,673,613
$25,068,732 $36,747,962

$6,594,460
$60,351
$896,528
$87,885
$50,205
$5,120
$325,787
$176,675
$321,313
$90,914
$200,994
$8,810,232

-

-

$1,353,277
$150,000
$444,000
$658,363
$969,103
$723,786
$4,298,529

$33,878,964 $41,046,491

Appendix B: Oklahoma City Aircraft Repair Costs

AGMC
$16,622,761

Aircraft Repair
Repair
RLG SRU Repair
Material (GFM/CAP)
Lease
Award Fee
Government O/H

-

$8,744,314
-

Subtotal:

$25,367,075

Cost Adjustments:
AGMC
BOS Adjustment
Gov't Organic PMS
Unfunded Civilian Retirement
State Unemployment Payments
Casualty Insurance
Impact Aid
Retiree Health Benefits
Depreciation for MCP Facilities
DFAS Support
Dispensary
Information Services
SubTotal:

$8,688,420
$132,702
$1,141,036
$124,823
$63,898
$6,516
$414,637
$177,623
$413,487
$116,995
$258,652
$11,538,789

BGRC
Equipment Depreciation
Travel
Capital Improvements
Privatization (PKT/DCAA/DCM
SubTotal:

-

BGRC
$22,472,115
$2,121,602
$8,744,314
$2,929,262
$2,489,227
$725,346
$39,481,865

-

$1,722,353
$100,000
$458,640
$1,387,336
$3,668,329

OC-Aircraft Total:

$36,905,863

$43,150,193

F-4/F16 Repair
Navy DMINS Repair
Grand Total:

$655,728
$907,087
$38,468,838

$599,337
$1,413,214
$45,162,744
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Appendix C: Warner Robins Metrology Privatization Costs

Metrology Privatization
Laboratory Operations
Lease Costs
Award Fee
Equipment Maintenance & Material
Government Furnished Material
SubTotal:

$5,572,928

Cost Adjustments:
AGMC
BOS Adjustment
Unfunded Civilian Retirement Benefits
State Unemployment Payments
Casualty Insurance
Impact Aid
Other Personnel Costs (Military)
Retiree Health Benefits
Other Support Services
SubTotal:

$2,337,879
$377,942
$28,431
$58,384
$1,302
$160,006
$137,513
$157,639
$3,259,096

WYLE
Equipment Depreciation
Travel
Privatization (AFMETCAL/DCAA/DCMC)
SubTotal:
Total:
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AGMC
$4,583,763
-

$989,165
-

-

$8,832,024

WYLE
$6,813,871
$2,642,749
$258,950
-

$27,948
$9,743,518

-

-

$979,277
$979,277
$10,722,795
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